

APPLYING ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT TO
COAST GUARD AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
FOR BLACK OFFICERS

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THESIS

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COAST GUARD AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
FOR BLACK OFFICERS

by

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Applying Organization Development to
Coast Guard Affirmative Action
For Black Officers

by

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Lieutenant Commander, United States Coast Guard
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I. INTRODUCTION

I suspect that it would be impossible to arrange an affirmative action program in a racially neutral way and have it successful...In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently. We cannot - we dare not - let the Equal Protection Clause perpetrate racial supremacy.

Supreme Court Justice Blackmun,
1978

A. THE PROBLEM

Current and past equal opportunity programs have not substantially increased the number of blacks in the officer corps of the United States Coast Guard. Not many Coastguardsmen have served under black officers, and not many will in the near term unless the Coast Guard changes some of its present equal opportunity and affirmative action strategy. This research project aims at developing a strategy for increasing black participation in the Coast Guard officer corps. It does so for two reasons:

- 1) The present underutilization of blacks in the Coast Guard continues to reflect the social and economic conditions of inequality which blacks have been subjected to for so long.
- 2) Fuller black participation in the officer corps is needed, and will be even more needed in the future.

Coast Guard equal opportunity statistics, as measured by black officer representation in the Coast Guard, have not

significantly changed despite the existence of equal opportunity programs over the past several years. For example, in 1975 the percent of black officers in the Coast Guard was 1.0. There were 43 black officers in a commissioned corps size of 4,264. In May 1979 it was 1.3. There were 63 black officers in a commissioned officer corps of 4,372. In both years there was a disproportionate number of black officers serving in the lower ranks. [DOT computer center Minority Status Report, 31 Dec. 1975 and DOT computer center Report #06238HR03, 31 May 1979] The numbers themselves are *prima facie* evidence of past racial discrimination. But discrimination is not the issue in this thesis - overcoming its effects is.

Do these statistics represent a problem for the Coast Guard? Does it matter that black representation in the officer corps is extremely low with little promise for change? These are critical questions the Coast Guard faces. The answer to both of these is, unequivocally, yes and this research project attempts to explain why.

An implicit goal of Coast Guard equal opportunity programs is to establish a future Coast Guard which reflects racial balance throughout its hierarchy and has an organizational climate which accepts diversity. However, too slow a pace toward accomplishing this goal may seriously hamper the Coast Guard's ability to perform its missions.

The Coast Guard's present course in affirmative action appears ill-advised. If it does not adopt a proactive,

voluntary stance in the officer corps, it may be ordered to perform affirmative action at someone else's discretion. Affirmative action may be imposed by the courts or the executive branch on their terms and at their pace. But if the Coast Guard adopted a more favorable approach to affirmative action, while it has time to be more selective, it could perhaps avoid negative consequences and keep the management of its personnel policies entirely in its own hands.

The pressure for equal opportunities for minorities continues to grow in all areas of government. The head of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Eleanor Norton, indicated that the government is worse than private industry when it comes to giving job opportunities to minorities and women. "For the first time in history, the federal sector does not outperform the private sector" in affirmative action. Ms. Holmes vowed to change the government's employment record under a presidential order. [Monterey Peninsula Herald, 6 Sept. 1979] Soon after taking office, the new Secretary of Transportation, Neil Goldschmidt, cited the Transportation Department* for its poor record on affirmative action. [LCDR Smith, 1979] It would not be a surprise to see in the near future large corporations (e.g., Sears, Kaiser, etc.) banding together to pressure the government into regulating itself

*The Coast Guard was shifted from the Treasury Department to the Department of Transportation in 1967.

more stringently in affirmative action, partly in return for the extreme pressure to which they have been subjected to by the government over the last decade.

As a result of this growing pressure, an edict of affirmative action could be imposed by the President, Secretary of Transportation, or Congressional action in the not too distant future. If this occurred, the Coast Guard's option to further develop its own voluntary affirmative action program would be eliminated and it might be told to arbitrarily increase its level of black participation in the officer corps.

Second, the present selection processes (Officer Candidate School and Coast Guard Academy) are vulnerable to court action, especially if the courts were to use selection guidelines already established for civilian institutions, the Bakke case notwithstanding. The Coast Guard's emphasis on a merit process, when in fact the examinations have not been validated for blacks, may prove discriminatory. This is true even though the sample size of black Coast Guard officers has not been sufficiently large for validity studies. [Fry, 1979, LCDR Smith, 1979] Rejecting qualified or qualifiable blacks now from the officer corps because they are not "best qualified" according to somewhat subjective and arbitrary criteria, could prove harmful to the quality of officers in the officer corps in the future. For example, if strict quotas were forced upon the officer corps by the courts, as they have been recently in a Detroit racial case involving its police department [Rowan,

1979], the Coast Guard might be forced to admit far greater numbers of black officers, some of whom may not be qualified or qualifiable.

Third, an issue which could seriously impinge on the effectiveness of Coast Guard missions is racial harmony. At present the black population in the enlisted ranks is 8.4 percent with a disproportionately heavier concentration of blacks in the lower ranks [DOT computer Center Report #06238HR03]. In order to meet overall enlisted recruiting goals, an increased dependence on recruiting blacks appears inevitable. The lack of black role models in the officer corps vis a vis an increasingly black enlisted corps makes the disparity in their ratios to whites a symbol of inequity. The absence of an equitable number of black officers will influence young enlisted blacks to view the Coast Guard white leadership as racist. One reason the Coast Guard has not had a serious racial incident in the past is due, in part, to its having had so few blacks. However, the Coast Guard may soon find itself in a position similar to the Navy's in the early 1970s when racial tension and flare-ups were common. The spectre of an intensifying backlash to black opportunities is again on the rise, as evidenced in part by recent KKK activities both in and out of the military. This increases the potential for racial unrest in the Coast Guard.

Fourth, it is likely that young blacks will be less willing to join organizations whose leadership reflects low black representation, especially since other organizations, military

and civilian, are beginning to demonstrate marked improvement (e.g., U.S. Army) in their representation of black leadership. This could adversely affect the Coast Guard's ability to meet its future manpower requirements.

Changing present equal opportunity and affirmative action policy and practices may seemingly involve risk, but failure to take the risk and make needed changes could produce far greater risks to Coast Guard mission effectiveness in the future. And it must be recognized that affirmative action programs are critical to achieving equal opportunity goals. Hand in hand with the realization that affirmative action is a necessary instrument for needed change is the clear understanding that there will be consequences, both societal and in-house, for doing affirmative action well or for not doing it well. These consequences will be reflected in terms of available labor resources, political climate, racial harmony, mission effectiveness, etc. The instinct here, without the benefit of a crystal ball, is that the Coast Guard, for all its advantages of size and flexibility, can put itself in a relatively attractive and advantageous position as an employer by vigorously pursuing affirmative action over the next several years.

Yet the full use of the affirmative action concept in the Coast Guard has not been openly or favorably endorsed [see Chapter IV, General Policy-Present State]. As a result a significant change in the Coast Guard's nearly all white officer image does not look to be forthcoming. Subtle as they may

be, hurdles for black officers in selection, promotion, assignment, and affiliation still exist.

B. DEFINITIONS

The terms equal opportunity and affirmative action are often confused and frequently have been used interchangeably. For example, Herbert Northrup's field interviews of people in the Navy and Marine Corps revealed that few people had a good understanding of the concept of affirmative action and usually failed to recognize any difference between the two terms. Since these two terms are repeatedly used in this thesis, the following definitions apply for Chapters III through V.

"A program of equal opportunity deals with eliminating any racial bias in an institution's criteria for hiring, job classification, and promotion selection" [Northrup, 1979]. The Coast Guard's new civil rights manual (COMDTINSTRUCTION M5350.11A) reflects this commitment. However, as Northrup points out, "the implementation of such a program alone, does not meet the commitments of affirmative action which are broadly outlined in ... the regulations of Executive Order 11246." Affirmative action is then defined as a program which "deals with recruiting and upgrading minority members of an institution so that they are represented more proportionally in all paygrades and occupational categories" [Northrup, 1979].

Thus, for purposes of this thesis equal opportunity means a policy where individuals are not excluded from any employment

activity because of race, color, sex, national origin, or religion. The policy calls for a neutral system of employment where neither intentional nor unintentional discrimination occurs. The system is "blind to race." And affirmative action means taking specific positive and aggressive actions to enhance the competitive ability of minorities and produce a situation where races and minorities are represented proportionally in an organization. It means eliminating barriers that act as obstacles to achieving equal opportunity. It also means evaluating the circumstances with "eyes wide open" and not being unequivocally "blind to race."

C. PREMISES

The next decade will bring special human resource challenges (e.g., manpower shortages, demands for equal opportunity, et al.) [Mills, 1979, Moskos, 1978] which the Coast Guard will have to be prepared to meet. In response to these challenges affirmative action goals cannot simply remain a goal. They must become a reality, and the seeds for achieving affirmative action goals must be planted now if the Coast Guard is to be able to truly call itself an equal opportunity employer.

Yet a significant new problem is that the majority of white Americans now perceives that "equality" has been achieved, and that past and present programs to improve the status of minorities are giving these groups an unfair and possibly unnecessary advantage. This is clearly the appeal of the term "reverse discrimination." Evidencing this view, a 1978 Gallup Poll found

that whites ranked the problems of black Americans last on a list of thirty-one concerns [Dreyfuss and Lawrence, 1979].

At the heart of this issue are the perceptions and attitudes surrounding the concept of "equality." Equal opportunity in the Coast Guard emphasizes giving individuals equal treatment. There is little consideration given to equal treatment for entire groups. This shortcoming should be approached with affirmative action since equal opportunity programs do not produce equitable distribution in the near future. (See Chapter IV, General Policy-Future State for further discussion on equality.)

It is a premise of this paper that, today, leadership rhetoric in the Coast Guard is filled with forceful arguments for treating everyone equally and for being "colorblind" in practices and policies. (For examples see the Coast Guard Civil Rights Manual or Commander, Twelfth Coast Guard District Affirmative Action Plan.) These arguments are supported on the "theoretical concepts of equality" while they ignore the vast differences, i.e., job opportunities for whites and blacks to gain entrance into the officer corps. In an ideal world theoretical concepts of equality would be the only tenable base for personnel policies. But as U.S. Circuit Judge Damon J. Kieth declared in the Detroit police case, "No one relishes racial classifications, however, until our society progresses further, affirmative action will remain a necessity" [Rowan, 1979].

D. AN APPROACH

The Commandant, Admiral John B. Hayes, recently suggested that three management premises be considered:

- 1) Don't be bound by our own rules; if we wrote the book we can change it when reason indicates or apply it with discretion.
- 2) Be bound by law; particularly by its intent; seek to change the bad law; revise the poor regulation.
- 3) Foster innovation; be willing to try new methods and procedures. Be able to accept that all will not succeed. [Hayes, 1979]

In consonance with the Commandant's encouragement to foster innovation, it was felt that applying organization development concepts to affirmative action for black officers could help lead to better solutions which would bring the Coast Guard closer to "the vision of a multi-racial destiny that would eliminate color as a subject for debate" [Dreyfuss and Lawrence, 1979]. Utilizing an organization change model to focus on Coast Guard affirmative action can perhaps provide added insight and assistance toward achieving the organizational goal of true and complete equal opportunity.

The organizational change model selected as a strategy for this research was developed by Richard Beckhard and Reuben T. Harris in their book Organizational Transitions: Managing Complex Change (1977). It is a change model which provides a detailed blueprint for answering the three questions which the discipline of organization development typically asks: Where are we? Where would we like to be? And, how do we get there?

Collecting data to help answer these questions involved conducting interviews with key people in the Coast Guard organization, and pursuing an extensive literature search on affirmative action, racial issues, and organization development. By tying these three subjects together it is hoped that this researcher can influence the Coast Guard strategy for accomplishing its important objectives in civil rights, as well as creating a "felt need" in the Coast Guard to rethink its present position on affirmative action.

The organization of the thesis is as follows: Chapter II is a discussion of affirmative action, what it is, how it developed, the controversy surrounding it, and why the military is required to perform it. Chapter III touches on organization development and describes the framework of the organizational change model used in the principle chapter, Chapter IV. Chapter IV's content includes a description of affirmative action and equal opportunity programs in the "present state," and a proposal for how it might look in the "future state." Chapter V contains the conclusions and recommendations, especially as they relate to a "transition state" for getting the Coast Guard to move smoothly from where it is now in terms of practices and policies to a position more consistent and effective with respect to equal opportunity and affirmative action goals.

II. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Affirmative action is discussed in a variety of contexts in this chapter. This is done in an effort to make affirmative action less a mystery and more understandable as a concept. Supported by some and decried by others, affirmative action is designed to help overcome a heritage of racial discrimination. The concept of affirmative action, which has been subject to continual and intense debate, has endured a long and slow evolutionary process. It has now reached the point where it is embroiled in significant controversy.

A. HISTORY

Affirmative action was essentially born out of civil rights legislation and a series of Presidential executive orders dating back to Franklin D. Roosevelt. As far back as 1935, the Wagner Act prescribed "affirmative action" and "cease and desist" remedies against employers who illegally discriminated against union members. Although this did not stem from a case involving minorities or women, it did introduce the general principle underlying affirmative action. This principle was "that a court order to cease and desist from some discriminatory practice may not be sufficient to undo the harm already done, or even to prevent additional harm as the result of a pattern of events set in motion by the prior illegal activity" [Sowell, 1977]. Hence, as a result of a non-racial issue, an affirmative action

remedy deemed necessary and appropriate for the circumstances was introduced. In this instance it provided for a reinstatement of unlawfully discharged union employees, with back pay, plus an imposed requirement on the company to post notices in a conspicuous location iterating the company's "new" employment policy toward union members [Sowell, 1977].

In the 1960s the principle of affirmative action resurfaced, this time as a strong alliance to the ongoing effort to eliminate racial discrimination in America. President Kennedy's issuance of Executive Order 10925 established the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity and provided the first official requirement that federal contractors "will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin [26 Fed. Reg. 1977, 3CFR, 1959-63 comp. 448, pt 3,301(1)]. Although this coverage applied only to federal government contracts, it contained the language and reality of affirmative action. The requirement to pursue affirmative action and depart from the standard of simply practicing non-discrimination was set in motion. Thus, in this respect Executive Order 10925 differed from previous executive orders related to equal opportunity. It also carried certain sanctions for non-compliance. But, apart from the fact that it placed emphasis on minority recruiting, it had little real effect in changing the social order [Benokraitis and Feagin, 1978]. Yet significantly, as the

first step, it introduced affirmative action as a prime operational tactic to bring about equal opportunity.

Although some token changes in employment practices were made as a result of Executive Order 10925, it was not until the 1964 Civil Rights Act and subsequent executive orders 11246 and 11375, signed by President Johnson in 1965 and 1967 respectively, that affirmative action began to take on the potential for substantial impact on society. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 enunciated a national policy of equal employment opportunity in private employment. "However, it specifically denied any requirement of preferential treatment for the purpose of curing an imbalance in the racial composition of a given body of employees or apprentices" [Marino, 1978].

Executive Order 11246 carried over the concept of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to apply for government contractors, subcontractors, and the United States government itself. It also ordered as government policy the promotion of the full realization of equal employment opportunity through a positive, continuous program of affirmative action. Executive Order 11375 amended Executive Order 11246 to include prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex. It not only outlaws discrimination but also carries a provision that contractors develop written affirmative action plans that attempt to remedy the present effects of past discrimination in our society [Chayes, 1974]. In addition, it had the effect of delegating investigative powers and enforcement procedures to a variety of federal agencies. Although, on paper this order was most explicit

in its affirmative action intent, and contained the most severe sanctions for non-compliance, it still had minimal effect in changing the reality of disparity between blacks and whites in organizations [Benokraitis and Feagin, 1978].

Affirmative action was soundly established as a principle and instrument of social change between 1968 and 1972. Of particular importance was the passing of the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act, which amended and extended Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act; and the *Griggs vs Duke Power Co.*, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). This case decided that "employment tests or qualifications which screen out minorities or women at a greater rate than others cannot be used unless the employer proves that the screening device in question is manifestly related to the job for which it is used: Such proof must be in the form of a validation study" [Albrecht and Hall, 1979]. Part of this period's emphasis was a broader focus of affirmative action. It included attention on more systematic practices of discrimination matched by an understanding of the basic root causes of discrimination in organizations. As a result, newer affirmative action programs have surfaced in various organizations which appear more positive in promoting equity and fairness [Albrecht and Hall, 1979].

B. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEFINITIONS

Today affirmative action

precisely used, entails government fostered and voluntary action by public and private organizations going beyond the cessation of

formal discrimination practices. Affirmative action means more than passive non-discrimination. It means that various organizations must act positively, affirmatively and aggressively to remove all barriers, however informal or subtle, that prevent access by minorities and women to their rightful places in the employment and educational institutions of the United States. [Benokraitis and Feagin, 1978]

Prior to the 1970s affirmative action meant to actively advertise opportunities for minorities; it meant to seek out those not yet qualified and prepare them for better jobs and educational opportunities. However, in the early 1970s the meaning of affirmative action developed into more than the active pursuit of minorities by employers. "It came to mean the setting of statistical requirements based on race, color, and national origin for employers and educational institutions" [Glazer, 1975].

Another definition for "affirmative action is, as the term implies, the use of positive, results oriented practices to ensure that women, minorities, handicapped persons, and other protected classes of people will be equitably represented in the organization. Put another way, affirmative action is any action that is taken specifically to overcome the results of past discriminatory employment practices [Albrecht and Hall, 1979].

C. CONTROVERSY

The theoretical justification of any affirmative action program rests on the realization that certain groups of individuals have been victimized by past discriminatory activities, and special efforts must be made to compensate for those effects. [Marino, 1978]

Prior to the decade of the 1970s few white males perceived minorities as a threat to their status. Societal programs to bring about equality were generally accepted, perhaps because they had no real impact on changing the social picture. Yet during the time frame when affirmative action was gaining an effective foothold, 1964-1974, many white males began to perceive the minority as a threat. Out of this perception was born the concept of "reverse discrimination." It surfaced as a result of a demand for equal opportunity being translated into a demand for equality of results through affirmative action. The controversy, oversimplified, boils down to society's asking "to what extent, if any, should one group be discriminated against (through reverse discrimination) in society's attempt to provide equal opportunities for another group" [Rosen, 1975].

At one extreme affirmative action is considered to be tantamount to racial, sexual, and ethnic discrimination while at the other extreme, the lack of implementation of affirmative action is regarded as perpetuating the illusive aspects of the American dream of equal opportunity. But many Americans lie in between these extremes and for the most part do not understand the difference between non-discrimination and affirmative action [Benokraitis and Feagin, 1978].

Nathan Glazer has presented an argument in his book Affirmative Discrimination (1974) that the present course in affirmative action policies is making matters worse. "The new course threatens the abandonment of our concern for individual

claims to consideration on the basis of justice and equity, now to be replaced with a concern for rights for publicly determined and delimited groups." Glazer further points out that supporters of the new policies, i.e., requirements for statistical parity between racial and ethnic groups, argue that they are only temporary ones, ones needed to overcome the prolonged history of discrimination in America. Glazer does not agree with this line of thinking fearing that the present course in affirmative action policies will become permanent. Instead, he feels that

compensation for the past is a dangerous principle. It can be extended indefinitely and make for endless trouble. Who is to determine what is proper compensation for the American Indian, the black, the Mexican American, the Chinese or Japanese American? When it is established that the full status of equality is extended to every individual, regardless of race, color, or national origin, one has done all that justice and equity call for and that is consistent with a harmonious multigroup society. [Glazer, 1974]

Joel Dreyfuss and Charles Lawrence argue differently in their book, The Bakke Case.

A fundamental difference between blacks and whites lay in their different concepts of the role that government should play in their lives. The expression of middle-class sentiment in Proposition 13 had its applications in Bakke as well. At its core was a racial difference in perceptions of America. Most whites believed that our major racial problems had been solved, but most blacks did not. Justice Marshall, in arguing that the melting pot had not worked for blacks, reflected that minority perception. Without a national consensus to provide energy and momentum, the movement toward equality was stalled. Opponents of race-sensitive measures saw the country as a collection of competing ethnic groups whose only rights were individual

and whose achievements were simply the result of merit. Such a vision of America was comforting to those in the best position to reap the benefits of privilege. [Dreyfuss and Lawrence, 1979]

In their very next paragraph, Dreyfuss and Lawrence begin to point out the disturbing signs of complacency and intolerance which they see evident in America today.

Racial minorities would find it difficult, in light of their own experiences, to accept such a picture of America. As long as opportunities were color-coded, there was a contradiction between the comfortable mythology of the meritocracy and the realities of American life. The sharp racial differences in life expectancy, medical care, income, job categories, education, and political power all were a part of that reality. Those who argued for improved educational opportunities rather than more drastic adjustments were ignoring disparities that went beyond differences in schooling. How would they explain that white high school dropouts had lower unemployment rates than black youths with some college education or that the economic gap between blacks and whites was widening despite growing numbers of blacks in higher education? The experience of professional schools and corporations had shown that qualifications was not such an easy term to define. A very real resistance to affirmative action came from a justifiable fear of competition. Just as whites wanted to narrow the competitive field as much as possible, minorities saw they needed government intervention to get a fair share. [Dreyfuss and Lawrence, 1979]

As a result of a combination of the many legal decisions requiring affirmative action, confusion over their interpretation, and a subtle undercurrent of racism, a backlash erupted in the 1970s. A significant perception generated in the white male community was that whites were now being discriminated against since they felt they no longer could compete evenly with minorities who had been given "preferential treatment" [Glazer, 1974].

In 1975 it was suggested that the equal employment opportunity movement had reached its moment of truth. "Its seemingly irresistible forces of social justice and human rights now confront the equally immovable barriers of job performance necessities and constitutional rights" [Lopez, 1975].

Many American institutions have felt caught in the middle of this squeeze. Up until the Brian Weber Supreme Court decision* companies felt, and probably still do to a large extent, that they were being squeezed from several directions. On the one hand if they moved voluntarily to correct imbalances they ran the risk of reverse discrimination suits by white males, like Weber's. On the other hand if they failed to act, special interest groups, representing a variety of causes might challenge the lack of affirmative action implementation through lawsuits, job bias charges, etc., and, more importantly, the government could withhold important federal contracts. Companies also often felt confused by the pile of conflicting, overlapping, and complex federal and state directives which emanated from numerous federal and state agencies [Rowan, 1978].

* Brian Weber sued Kaiser Aluminum because less senior minorities were being selected over him for advanced training as part of Kaiser's affirmative action program. The actual issue was this: When may a company and/or union voluntarily take action based on race to remedy racial injustices of the past? Weber lost the case in the Supreme Court when it ruled 5-2 in favor of affirmative action principles in 1978.

Now that the Brian Weber case has been resolved by the Supreme Court, some companies fear that the government has license to "tighten the screws." The fear is that the effect of the decision may increase the demand for numerical goals and timetables and that it has removed barriers which reluctant employers have been choosing to hide behind [Lehner and Falk, 1979].

Some of the Supreme Court Justices' opinions in the Weber case are worth noting. Justice Brennan, relying on the "spirit" of the job-bias provision of the 1964 Civil Rights Act said "It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a nation's concern over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot" of those who had been victims "constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy." Further, "the majority opinion made clear that a racial preference in private employment is permissible wherever there are manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories." And finally, Justice Blackmun explained that the court "considers a job category to be 'traditionally segregated' when there has been a societal history of purposeful exclusion of blacks from the job category, resulting in a persistent disparity between the proportion of blacks in the labor force and the proportion of blacks among those who hold jobs within the category" [Lehner and Falk, 1979].

Certainly the controversy surrounding affirmative action is complex and value laden. Questions of consistency, fairness, and justice are continuously being asked. Regardless, affirmative action laws are in existence to guide American institutions, but apparently a major stumbling block to affirmative action implementation is the failure of many U.S. institutions to breathe life into these laws already on the books. The lack of compliance with the laws and guidelines on affirmative action by public and private institutions alike continues to be a frustrating anchor on any significant movement in many affirmative action programs.

D. NEGATIVE EFFECTS

Affirmative action has not existed without its negative effects. Both blacks and whites have criticized affirmative action for a variety of reasons. Perhaps the most significant criticism of affirmative action is that it lends people the impression that minorities and women receive their jobs or status in the organization as a result of affirmative action, that any "hard-earned achievements are simply conferred benefits" [Sowell, 1978]. This attitude has deleterious consequences. It perpetuates negative assumptions that many whites hold about the relative competence and intelligence of women, minorities, and in particular, of blacks.

Another criticism is generated by Felix M. Lopez. He states that affirmative action policies are creating more problems than they are trying to solve:

A careful and dispassionate analysis of current events suggest that the present mish-mash of selection guidelines, affirmative action plans, fair employment legislation, civil service regulations, labor agreements, and company personnel practices, not only hinders the finding of a solution but actually aggravates the problem. [Lopez, 1975]

E. MILITARY

In general the military services have adopted an equal opportunity stance which attempts to embody the spirit of fair treatment and equal opportunity by strict application of equal treatment policies for all individuals. This posture essentially follows the non-discrimination guidelines set down by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 1972 Amendment to that act, and Executive Order 11246. In 1970 Executive Order 11246 (originally issued in 1965) and its implementing regulations were extended to cover all the Department of Defense Armed Forces by the Code of Federal Regulations [32 CFR 191.1, 1976]. (This does not include the Coast Guard since the Coast Guard is an agency in the Department of Transportation.) One of the implementing requirements of Executive Order 11246 is that agencies shall take affirmative action to correct problems of minority underutilization. "To be in concert with these laws as they have been interpreted, the services public policies must afford minorities every available opportunity to develop their abilities and to achieve the highest position commensurate with their abilities, and must aim at making minority representation in all positions reflect those minorities'

representation in the nation" [Northrup, 1979]. 32 CFR part 191 makes it very clear that the DOD military departments are required to practice affirmative action. The Coast Guard's legislative requirement to practice affirmative action is less specific. Section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended requires all federal agencies to maintain an affirmative program of equal employment opportunity. However, as a result of other federal policy guidelines, it is apparent that the Coast Guard should be using affirmative action guidelines in its employment practices (see Present State-General Policy).

F. SUMMARY

The affirmative action concept has evolved due to society's slow progress in bringing minorities into the mainstream of American economic and social life. It is not a popular concept; many white males regard it as a threat and point to reverse discrimination for argument and support. The courts have continued to interpret its use as an instrument for social change but it remains a subject for heated discussion and intense debate. It has changed the social order in some respects, but it also has been criticized for being counter-productive as well. Yet in spite of all its controversy, faults, criticism, etc., it is the law of the land; all government agencies are required to perform it.

III. ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT AND THE MODEL

This chapter introduces and describes an organization development (OD) change model which is useful as a framework for diagnosing where problems exist and what kinds of changes are needed in organizations. In particular, this model will be used in the following chapter to examine certain dimensions of Coast Guard equal opportunity and affirmative action. Using this model may prove beneficial to the Coast Guard in managing the "change process - 'the transition state' - moving from today's condition to some desired future state" [Beckhard and Harris, 1977], in its equal opportunity and affirmative action programs.

A. ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT (OD)

When paired with the powerful tools and concepts of OD, equal opportunity and affirmative action goals have a better chance of being accepted and achieved. Choosing to focus on Coast Guard equal opportunity and affirmative action for officers in an OD context offers promise for the Coast Guard to produce more tangible and measurable results. The potential impact for OD to guide organizations toward becoming more "human" and effective is enormous. Chris Argyris says that "at the heart of organization development is the concern for the vitalizing, energizing, actualizing, activating, and renewing of organizations through technical and human resources" [Argyris, 1971].

According to Edgar Huse organization development "is a newly emerging discipline directed toward using behavioral science knowledge to assist organizations to adjust more rapidly to change" [Huse, 1975]. Richard Beckhard defines OD as a total system, planned change effort "based on behavioral science knowledge; it is managed from the top, and it is organization wide in its approach. It is concerned with the development, change, and improvement of system and subsystem. It is focused on and closely related to short- and medium-term organization mission goals; its aim is to increase organization health and effectiveness" [Beckhard, 1969]. More recently French and Bell explain OD as a "planned, systematic process in which applied behavioral science principles and practices are introduced into an ongoing organization toward the goals of effecting organization improvement, greater organizational competence, and greater organizational effectiveness" [French and Bell, 1978].

An example of "organization effectiveness" is given by Gardner. He describes it as a process of "self renewal" and it contains five rules:

- 1) The first rule is that the organization must have an effective program for the recruitment and development of talent.
- 2) The second rule for the organization capable of continuous renewal is that it must be a hospitable environment for the individual.
- 3) The third rule is that organizations must have built in criteria for self-criticism.

4) The fourth rule is that there must be fluidity in the internal structure.

5) The fifth rule is that the organization must have some means of combatting the process by which men become prisoners of their procedures. [Gardner, 1965]

1. Systems Theory

Particularly relevant to organization development is the concept that organizations are systems and that systems theory plays an important function in the assumptions of organization development. "Using a systems approach, OD has grown rapidly in response to a need - the need for organizations to remain viable and to survive in a world of change" [Huse, 1975]. The use of a systems approach is now a major component of organization development, and organizations are typically viewed in OD as open social systems.

a social organization has a number of highly interdependent and interrelated subsystems. Second, a social system is not only open, but also highly dynamic, being characterized by inputs, operations, outputs, boundaries, and feedback. Third, a social system uses both positive and negative feedback in an attempt to achieve balance. Fourth, a social system is characterized by a wide multiplicity of objectives, purposes, and functions which may, at times, be in conflict. [Huse and Bowditch, 1973]

A system can be defined as "a series of interrelated and interdependent parts, such that the interaction or interplay of any of the subsystems (parts) affects the whole" [Huse and Bowditch, 1973]. Utilizing the systems concept, French and Bell view organizations "as consisting of a number of significant interacting variables which cut across or are common to all subunits. These variables have to do with

goals, tasks, technology, human-social organization, structure, and external interface relationships" [French and Bell, 1978].

Figure 1 illustrates French and Bell's description of major organizational subsystems.

In essence, system theory permits clearer understanding and better appreciation for the dynamics of change in organizations. It is a powerful concept which is useful in asking meaningful questions of the organization and in planning change strategies. "Without the system concept, we tend to see problems (and solutions) in isolation, without recognizing their impact on the total organization as a total system composed of interdependent and interrelated parts" [Huse, 1975].

Perhaps its usefulness is more easily recognized when highlighting several consequences of viewing a social organization from a systems point of view:

1) One of the most important consequences of viewing organizations from a systems point of view is the realization that a change in one of the subsystems will have an impact on all of the other subsystems.

2) A second consequence is the understanding that reducing role ambiguity should enhance organizational effectiveness and increase personal satisfaction since researchers have found that role ambiguity was highly linked with such factors as employee anxiety, job satisfaction, organizational effectiveness, and the tendency to quit.

3) A third consequence is...that the systems approach avoids the "single-cause habit of thinking." It assumes that events occur as a result of many forces acting in complex relationships to one another.

4) A fourth consequence is the concept of equilibrium. There is a strong tendency for organizations to maintain equilibrium and to be conservative in the search for stability. However, from a systems point of view, equilibrium is necessary to avoid wild, erratic swings. Nevertheless, unless their system can change, there can be little progress.

FIGURE 5-2
Major Organizational Subsystems




Figure 1

5) Other consequences of viewing organizations from a systems approach include the appreciation of the concepts of function, boundary, and a better understanding of multiplicity of purposes, functions and objectives which a total system can have. [Huse, 1975]

For example, looking at Coast Guard equal opportunity and affirmative action vis a vis goals, structure, manpower planning, environmental factors, Congressional influence, organization climate, etc., and to describe the various forces interacting on these variables is to approach it from a systems point of view. The systems approach provides additional insight into the complexity of the variables in equal opportunity and affirmative action.

This brief and oversimplified discussion of OD, and its reliance on systems theory, provides an appreciation of the setting from which the organization change model developed. The model, as it relates to a systems point of view, offers a manager a specific process for his or her systemwide planning.

If one accepts this concept (open system), planning an effective change strategy requires: (1) mapping the environmental forces and demands; (2) having a clear picture of present and desired organizational responses to these demands; (3) having a program of prioritized activities that are responsive to these demands; and (4) having a system for assessing the impact of these demands on the organization's objectives and activities over time. [Beckhard and Harris, 1977]

The model, as used in the following chapter, addresses these issues with respect to equal opportunity and affirmative action. It is a model which gives managers a way of thinking about planned change and a way to go about it.

B. THE BECKHARD AND HARRIS MODEL

The model was presented in 1977 as part of a series of books on organizational development. The authors, Richard Beckhard and Reuben T. Harris, describe a useful way for a manager (or consultant) to focus on the tasks he (or she) must perform to successfully introduce and accomplish desired major organizational change. Underlying the planned change model is an emphasis on systems technology. "At the basis of this latter perspective is the view of an organization as a complex set of interdependent subsystems - people, structures, technology, tasks - which are embedded in a dynamic environment and recognition of the need for developing and maintaining compatibility among these subsystems" [Beckhard and Harris, 1977].

The model, in essence, revolves around the concept of "transition management." This concept helps the manager to more effectively manage the change process and includes a way to accurately analyze the "change" picture and perform the appropriate actions to successfully accomplish major organization change. (Appendix A is a flow block diagram - the Transition Management Planning Model - developed by Reuben T. Harris, 1979. This model is a systematic presentation of the sequence of events of the organizational change model which is explicitly detailed in the Beckhard and Harris book. It outlines the key processes of the transition state.)

Since the demands of change on organizations are becoming increasingly complex, Beckhard and Harris advocate as part of

their model that the manager "needs knowledge, skills, and technology as never before to help in (1) understanding the present state of affairs in the organization, (2) developing relatively clear goals of where he or she wants the organization to get to in the intermediate future, (3) producing a fairly clear picture of a desired state to be achieved by some specified time, and (4) specifying a clear picture of the state which must exist during the interim" [Beckhard and Harris, 1977]. Thus, key to Beckhard and Harris's model are the explicit descriptions the manager must have of the "present state," "future state," and "transition state." Each state is seen as a distinct organizational condition.

1. Present State

In defining the present state the manager (chief executive officer) has to specifically ask "Where are we?" and be assured that he is getting accurate answers to his questions. He must know how his managers are behaving, where his people are attitudinally, what the problems are, etc.

Defining the present state in one's organization takes on special importance when a manager has set explicit goals for a desired future state. He must know where his organization "is" on a multitude of dimensions and variables or else he risks a significant amount of confusion, resistance and even failure in his attempt to move his organization from the present state to the future state. Thus, as he relies on his map of the future, he also must depend on having a clear perception of how things operate in the present, especially as they relate to the goals to be accomplished in the future

tate. Beckhard and Harris ask the following questions of the present state:

- 1) What parts of the system are most significantly involved in the change process?
- 2) What changes in present attitudes or behaviors or ways of work would probably have to occur if the desired goal were to be reached?
- 3) Which processes need to be changed for the change to be effective? The processes or variables which need to be examined include: changes of attitudes required, changes of practices required, changes of policies, changes of structures required, and changes of rewards required.
- 4) What is the "readiness" and "capability" for each sub-part of the organization to change?

A way to examine the change process in regards to readiness and capability was developed by David Gleicher who addressed the "cost of changing." His formula for determining cost:

$C = (ABD) > X$. C=change, A=level of dissatisfaction with the status quo, B=clear desired state, D=practical first steps towards desired state, and X=cost of change. In other words, there has to be enough dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs (A) for someone to be mobilized for change. The various subsystems need to have clear enough goals (B); otherwise the cost (X) is too high. For each subsystem, there needs to be some awareness of practical first steps (D) to move, if movement is to take place. [Beckhard and Harris, 1977]

If A, B, or D are low then C, the amount of change, will be low. Using this simple formula can be a practical way for a manager to discover some of the barriers to the change process. The manager can more easily decide where to begin to attack the problems that confront him.

2. Future State

After defining the need for change, which more often than not arises as a result of some external pressure to the organization, the manager needs to have a clear picture of a desired future state. He has to be able to visualize the organization blueprint of the future. This future state is to be visualized as more than just the result of setting goals and objectives with the assumption that the desired future state will then occur. Typically, a future state is fuzzy to managers; they usually rely on some abstract goals and often expect them to happen. Beckhard and Harris suggest that the manager should visualize a future state in an explicit manner. He must "see" how it looks. He should be able to describe the processes, behaviors, structures, rewards, etc., in his organization of tomorrow.

It is the goals he sets which determine his approach to the change strategy, as well as reveals the chosen set of values underlying the desired change. As an example, a manager may choose to do the "minimum to get by" in affirmative action or take on a very positive, action oriented stance. Both kinds of actions have impact on the future state, but each one obviously different. Resources are affected differently; there are differences in the rewards mechanisms; the emphasis on changing attitudes and beliefs will be different in both kind and degree. Thus, if a manager is sincere about the goals he has set, he must know what he wants the end, future state to look like.

"For example, if one were to take a picture of the new condition of the affirmative action situation, what would be happening? What would the policies be? What would the practices be? What kinds of training would be occurring? What would be the mix of personnel at that point?" [Beckhard and Harris, 1977].

For a change strategy to be effective, this kind of detailed description of the desired future state is becoming increasingly important. The rapid rate of change in our society demands that management be able to manage the process of change, as well as perform its other functions. When developing change strategies Beckhard and Harris suggest

that management develop a detailed description of what the organization will look like when the desired condition is achieved. This description should specify the expected organizational structure, reward system, personnel policies, authority and task-responsibility distributions, managerial styles and roles, performance review systems, and performance outcomes. Ideally this 'wide-angle' view will be a comprehensive description of the future state. However, the key point is that a detailed picture should be produced, be it a 'snapshot' or a 'movie.' Defining explicitly what the organization would look like in the new state serves as a descriptive guide for determining the change strategy. When coupled with an assessment of the present state, this 'picture' of the future condition provides the information necessary for management to develop realistic action plans and timetables for managing the change. [Beckhard and Harris, 1977]

This detailed blueprint of the desired future state serves as a homing beacon. The manager and his associates can develop their action strategies around this keenly visualized future state. One last consideration is that once the

organization achieves the desired future, the manager needs to take steps to maintain the change. People in the organization need to behave compatibly with the "future state." Thus stability in the desired future state is also a goal [Harris, 1978].

3. Transition State

The transition state is an important "period of time and state of affairs" to be managed. Once the desired future state is clearly described, and the present state is well understood and defined, the manager has to think carefully about the time frame between the present and future states. This time frame must be seen as a unique and distinct period to be managed. The manager must be prepared to facilitate the transition state while simultaneously manage the day to day affairs of the organization.

As part of the transition state, the manager must develop a change strategy which is compatible with the change effort. The important issues proposed by Beckhard and Harris include:

- 1) Determining the degree of choice about whether to change
- 2) Determining what needs changing;
- 3) Determining where to intervene;
- 4) Choosing intervention technologies.

Part and parcel to transition state management is the fact that it is often difficult for a stable organization to change itself. Harris and Beckhard point out that the creation of temporary systems are often necessary in order to accomplish

the change. The regular structures of the organization have difficulty in becoming the structures used to manage the change. Therefore, a separate management and structure may be needed to accommodate the transition period and its processes.

Two other key areas affecting the transition state involve 1) developing a process or activity plan for the change, and 2) developing a commitment plan to begin getting the essential people committed to support the change process. In the consideration of planned change it is apparent that transition management and governance of the structure are keys to success. However, the transition state is often overlooked, often with serious consequences. Yet if managers spend the time and effort to explore this valuable concept, implementing planned change would be less difficult.

C. SUMMARY

In this chapter an organizational change model was discussed. The model springs from the applied science discipline of organization development which is concerned with improving organizations through an approach aimed at successfully managing the process of change. Organization development relies on a total systems view of organizations and offers new technologies and models for realizing organizational goals in an increasingly complex environment.

The Beckhard and Harris model offers a technique or a way of conceptualizing the managing of a major organizational

change process. The following chapter addresses equal opportunity and affirmative action in the Coast Guard officer corps using the concepts and framework of the Beckhard and Harris model.

IV. U.S. COAST GUARD (PRESENT STATE - FUTURE STATE)

One of the key steps in the Bekchard and Harris model was to carefully assess the "present state" and a desired "future state" of an organization. In detailing the present and future states for Coast Guard affirmative action for black officers the following dimensions were used: Coast Guard general policy on affirmative action, the organizational climate, the recruitment of black officers, the selection process, assignment and promotion policies, and civil rights training.

In describing the present state, the intent was not to be evaluative but rather it was to present a descriptive picture of the current state of affairs regarding black officers and affirmative action in the Coast Guard. Underlying the discussion and description of a proposed future state, selected in this instance as a period of time one to three years hence, is the notion that the future can be better. In fact, it needs to be better relative to affirmative action goals if the Coast Guard is to manage the complex process of social change without disruption and interference of its missions. Social change is not something to be left unattended or to chance. It is a process that requires effective management and organization development can help guide the process more competently and effectively with its diagnostic approach to change problems.

A. PRESENT STATE

1. General Policy

The concept of affirmative action has either a veiled existence or is completely disavowed in the various written equal opportunity policies in the Coast Guard. The Commandant, Admiral John B. Hayes, in promulgating the new Civil Rights Manual [COMDTINST M5350.11A] states that "the objectives of the military civil rights program is to ensure full and affirmative implementation of civil rights and equal opportunity laws and precepts within the service." The Commandant also stated that "this objective can only be achieved through the elimination of discrimination based on race, color, sex, national origin, and religion." Nowhere does the Commandant state outright support for the use of affirmative action for rectifying the problems caused by past and present discrimination. It should be recognized that "affirmative implementation" does not necessarily mean affirmative action, and from the Commandant, the difference between a tacit approval of affirmative action as opposed to an outright endorsement is significant. The significance is quickly established by the tone set in the Civil Rights Manual. As the definitive, broad policy document on civil rights for the Coast Guard it essentially represents an aggressive stance toward creating a climate of non-discrimination.

The Coast Guard is committed to a program of aggressive action to achieve equality of opportunity and treatment for all personnel. Race religion, color, national origin, and sex are not factors in determining the worth of an individual in the service and therefore, shall

not be factors in determining how an individual is to be treated. [Introduction to Coast Guard Military Civil Rights Manual, COMDTINST M5350.11A]

But according to several recent authors (e.g., Albrecht and Hall, 1979, Northrup, 1979) non-discrimination by itself is not affirmative action. "To be truly affirmative, a company must take specific steps to remedy the present effects of past practices. What this may mean in practice is that a company has to go out of its way to recruit, select, train, and promote ...minorities...until they are equitably represented in the work force" [Albrecht and Hall, 1979].

In the Policy section of the Coast Guard Military Civil Rights Manual the two precepts which provide the basis for "full and affirmative implementation of civil rights and equal opportunity laws" are listed as:

1) Personnel Treatment. The equal and just treatment of all personnel is a well established principle of law as well as effective personnel management. Such treatment is essential to attaining and maintaining an optimum state of morale, discipline, and readiness.

2) Discriminatory Practices. Discriminatory practices directed against military personnel and their dependents who lack a civilian's freedom of choice in where to live, work, travel, and spend off duty hours are not only illegal but are harmful to unit effectiveness.

Neither of these precepts are concerned with recruiting or upgrading minorities so they will be more proportionally or equitably represented in all paygrades or occupational categories. Thus, it is apparent that affirmative action is not one of the precepts used by the Coast Guard to support "full and affirmative implementation of civil rights and equal opportunity laws."

Further evidence of non-commitment to affirmative action is found in the Commandant's Long Range View, 1978. The Commandant states that "to the extent possible, the Coast Guard will take an active role in pursuit of satisfying national needs, vice merely responding to existing conditions or waiting to be specifically directed." Later, in the Long Range view, he indicates that equal opportunity will continue to receive special attention, but no mention of affirmative action is evident, in spite of it being a federal requirement established to meet a national need.

Continuing to elaborate on the Coast Guard's general policy toward the use of affirmative action, we turn to Rear Admiral William J. Stewart, the Chief of Personnel. In an interview in July 1979 RADM Stewart indicated that the Coast Guard has no obligation to make-up for what was done in the past. He asserted that the Coast Guard is not involved in a make-up game or a numbers game. However, the admiral made clear that the Coast Guard is pursuing a vigorous policy designed to identify it as an equal opportunity employer. The Coast Guard is highly concerned about its image and is in contact with the NAACP, NNOA, LULAC, et al., for assistance and advice. As for change in the officer corps, RADM Stewart pointed out that the Coast Guard is involved in a series of low key actions (e.g., BOOST, MITE, NAPS-described in later sections of this chapter) which emphasize minority enrollment in the officer corps [RADM Stewart, 1979].

Another reflection of the prevailing view describing the general policy of the Coast Guard vis a vis affirmative action is found in a current District Military Affirmative Action Plan (DMAAP). The following was extracted from the Discussion section:

There is an opinion held by many people that affirmative action plans are designed to give preferential treatment to minorities and women. The DMAAP was specifically designed to outline methods to be used to gain equal treatment, not preferential treatment, for all members of the Coast Guard. [CCGD12 Instruction 5350 dated 12 Oct. 1978]

Decrying preferential treatment in favor of a theme of the strict application of equal treatment in what is purported to be an affirmative action plan indicates that the DMAAP is a misnomer. Although called an affirmative action plan, its intent is to eliminate bias and insure non-discrimination. It does not aim to increase minority representation at all levels in the Coast Guard. It is not a results oriented document. In actuality it is an equal opportunity policy document in tune with all other policy on civil rights in the Coast Guard.

It is fairly obvious that affirmative action is given a very low profile in the Coast Guard. Its veiled existence conveys a less than enthusiastic commitment to its principles. Maintaining low key programs which have had negligible results in bringing blacks into the mainstream of Coast Guard life further demonstrates the low priority placed on affirmative action principles. Given policies which disapprove of anything but equal treatment, the Coast Guard is practically locked

into a limited compliance strategy relative to the full and affirmative intent of civil rights and equal opportunity laws.

a. Affirmative Action Requirements

In contrast to this general policy is the requirement for the Coast Guard to perform affirmative action, especially given its present underutilization of black officers. The requirement is relatively clear and stems from a variety of legislation, executive orders, and policy documents. Principle among these are Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as Amended, Executive Order 11246, Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and the Department of Transportation's Civil Rights Policy Document.

Former Secretary of Transportation, Brock Adams, in amplifying the federal directives and legislation on equal opportunity issued the following specific guidance to the Department of Transportation in his Civil Rights Policy Statement [Appendix B]. It was issued on 31 March 1977. Three sections in the brief one page statement support and require the practice of affirmative action.

- 1) There shall be vigorous affirmative action to assure full, fair, and representative participation of minorities and women.
- 2) Equal employment must become a reality in this department, expressed by substantial increases in the number of minorities and women at all grade levels in the DOT work force.
- 3) The implementation of this policy shall be top priority. I shall insist that it be thoroughly understood, rigorously followed and recognized as an integral part of every program of this department. (Underlining done for author's emphasis)

Thus the Coast Guard, like all other federal agencies, is required to implement affirmative action in order to bring

fair representation of minorities in all ranks and levels of employment.

2. Organizational Climate

Assessing the organizational climate in the Coast Guard relative to the officer corps and affirmative action, requires drawing on findings internal and external to the organization. The external factors are general findings and are discussed because, in all probability, they reflect the Coast Guard climate internally, to some degree. In general the Coast Guard inherits the beliefs, attitudes, and values associated with equal opportunity and affirmative action from society at large. The yearly turnover of officers, some retiring, others resigning, and new ones arriving reflects the open system qualities of the organization. The boundaries of the organizational climate, in this instance, are extremely permeable.

a. Studies

Reflecting the organizational environment on affirmative action and equal opportunity have been two comprehensive studies conducted in the past seven years. A 1972-1973 study by the National Urban League found widespread racial bias in the Coast Guard [New York Times, 3 May 1974]. Upon completion of the study, Admiral Bender, the Coast Guard Commandant then, stated that special efforts were being made to increase minority representation in the Coast Guard officer ranks but were unsuccessful. He acknowledged that this generated dissatisfaction among minority personnel, and was cause for concern

and action. The admiral also indicated that "too few Coast Guard personnel have accurate perceptions of processes and policies related to equal opportunity and civil rights [National Urban League Study on Human Relation in the Coast Guard, 1972-1973].

In 1977 the Advanced Research Resources Organization conducted "An Investigation of Civil Rights Problems in the Coast Guard." Some of the findings that emerged relating to the officer corps were as follows:

- 1) Whites feel more than blacks that there is an acceptance of minority lifestyle differences in the Coast Guard.
- 2) Blacks encourage minority leadership more than do whites.
- 3) There is more supervisory discrimination experienced among blacks than among whites.
- 4) Blacks tend to feel more than whites that command communication with minorities is not very good.
- 5) Whites tend more to feel that minorities are getting more than their share of equal opportunity.
- 6) Whites are more positive in their assessment of command anti-discrimination activism in the Coast Guard than are blacks.
- 7) There is more interpersonal discrimination experienced among blacks than among whites. [Romanczuk and Glickman, 1977]

In addition, Romanczuk and Glickman stated that often incidences of discrimination go unreported. But apparently things are changing and more and more of these incidences are now being reported.

According to Captain Walden, Deputy Chief of the Office of Civil Rights, the number of discrimination complaints in the Coast Guard is on the increase. But he explained that

the increase is most likely due to increased awareness of grievance procedures and a willingness to use them [Capt. Walden, 1979].

More generally, discrimination in the military has recently been called a widespread problem. In an Air Force Times interview the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity, Kathleen Carpenter, stated that discrimination in military promotion, grading, and assignment policies still exist. It exists because past discriminatory practices and injustices have not been compensated for and therefore continue the effects of earlier discrimination practices (institutional discrimination). She also charged that too many military officials believe enough has been done to end discrimination. Their present attitude is apparently one where if they don't have an overt problem, they feel they don't have a problem [Carpenter, 1978].

In a study on affirmative action policy, Captain John Condon, USA, attempted to measure the degree of perceived affirmative action threat, i.e., the level of threatening feelings associated with affirmative action policies, held by white officer students attending the Command and General College. His hypothesis was that significant threat feelings were perceived but were separate from general racial feelings. Contrary to his hypothesis his study demonstrated that a high degree of affirmative action threat feeling was positively correlated with negative racial attitudes. In short his conclusion was that a person expressing a high feeling of

affirmative action threat is likely to express very intolerant general racial views [Condon, 1975].

Also in this vein, Johnson found that "it is likely that institutional arrangements and/or structure such as affirmative action programs may be sufficiently associated with blacks as to activate a concept of race and thereby illicit prejudicial attitudes and behaviors" [Johnson, 1976]. Additionally, adding to the emotional aspects of affirmative action are what have now become highly charged and ambiguous words such as "quota," "reverse discrimination," and "qualified."

b. The General Mood

No doubt the changing mood in America toward black opportunities over the past decade has affected men and women in the Coast Guard. A Harris Poll in 1970 showed that 76 percent of whites believed that blacks experienced discrimination in their effort to achieve equality. But just seven years later, another Harris Poll showed a sharp decline in this attitude. Only one third of whites believed that blacks were being discriminated against, and even fewer thought discrimination existed in housing, education, and unemployment. In fact, the majority of Americans (55%) felt that blacks were pushing too fast for equality. "If blacks were at the bottom, most of them (Americans) believed it was because of their own shortcomings" [Dreyfuss and Lawrence, 1979].

The statistics did not support the changing attitudes. For example, the median income for blacks in 1977

was 59% of white income, one percent higher than in 1966. Between 1967 and 1977 black unemployment doubled. Although some blacks made significant gains, there were more than offsetting losses. Studies in the labor market showed that blacks made their greatest gains in the last decade in areas where there was not much competition from whites. "The negative statistics were all higher than they had been during the era of urban violence" [Dreyfuss and Lawrence, 1979].

Edward Hall, the noted anthropologist, describes, in his book Beyond Culture (1976), his perception of a mounting frustration in the black community due to black talents and abilities going largely unrecognized and thwarted by a white majority. Their sense of powerlessness to make the system work, and even deeper, the black's self perception of being powerless can only have grave consequences unless altered [Hall, 1976].

c. Institutional Racism

Black managers, executives, administrators, etc., are often subjected to a variety of pressures, stress, and influences which do not affect their white counterparts. The resulting effects have often acted as hurdles for black upward mobility. Although individual racism, defined as overt acts of discrimination or violence, is no longer an accepted norm in the United States, institutional racism, which is far more subtle, runs rampant. According to Chesler:

American society now operates in a fashion that feeds upon historic injustice done to minority groups so as reinforce and maintain their lower status and lesser rewards. It is argued that this

is so embracing an operating principle that it no longer requires conscious or overtly racist acts to sustain it. Thus, racism is explained in terms of the normal operations of our institutions that are laid on top of patterns of historic injustice/racism. [Chesler, 1976]

Institutional racism operates in a variety of ways to limit blacks' upward mobility. The organizational climates of most modern companies have produced a lack of "fit" for the black to the company culture, i.e., the norms, expected behaviors, attitudes, values, etc. Most management blacks do not have access to the informal organization as do most whites. The social and political networks are not as open to him as they are to whites. Some persistent conflicts which operate to maintain a lack of fit between whites and blacks in the organization are: ethnocentrism (self-assured superiority of one's own perspective, values, and actions); the misplacement of one's own problem onto others as if they arose from the other group's inadequacies; denial of access to desired resources of opportunities; and disproportionate distribution of power [Fromkin and Sherwood, 1976].

d. Black Officer's Role and Expectation

In looking at the black officer's role and expectations in the Coast Guard we find that some of these conflicts operate to add certain pressures on the black officer. Some of these pressures were recently discussed by a retired Coast Guard officer, LCDR Max Berry. Over the years LCDR Berry has had the opportunity to counsel many black officers. According to LCDR Berry the typical young black Coast Guard officer (ensign, LTJG, and lieutenant) feels that he has to achieve a

level of performance above and beyond one that the average white needs to perform to get promoted. The black officer "feels" a more critical eye in being supervised by senior white officers and therefore feels he has to prove himself constantly. Because of their conditioning, blacks feel that they must always be "on watch." They are often wondering when the proverbial axe will fall. They simply expect it to happen. The black officer wants to be and act like everyone else but feels that if he slips up, he will get punished, whereas the young white officer can afford to make mistakes. Each time an adverse issue develops, the black officer believes that it will automatically be reflected in his fitness report. In a sense, the black officer suffers from a "crisis paranoia." His perception is such that he thinks he will not get a second chance. Therefore, the young black officer sometimes, in trying to prove himself, remains aloof from other officers in the wardroom. But he also feels the pressure to "join the wardroom." No doubt, the young black officer has a difficult role, perhaps more difficult than the average young white officer's role, but this is not often recognized or examined [LCDR Berry, 1979].

3. Recruiting

a. Background

To place the present state recruiting scene into better perspective, a little bit of history is in order. In 1968 ten officer billets were added for minority recruiting duty in recognition of the Coast Guard's inability to attract minorities. Since then their potential for recruiting

minorities has been watered down by the addition of a variety of other responsibilities, unrelated to minority recruiting. In December 1973 a recruiting division at Coast Guard headquarters and recruiting branches in each district were established. That same year the commandant of the Coast Guard established an 18% minority recruiting goal for both the officer and enlisted corps. This figure reflected the minority population of the nation. The commandant allowed for a three year buildup to achieve this goal. In 1975 the commandant, as a result of slow progress in minority recruiting, convened an ad hoc committee to try and stimulate better ways of creating minority representation. In 1976 the Minority Recruiting Plan (CG 477) was introduced. Subsequent to this, minority recruiting, except in the officer corps, began to show improvement. Officer recruitment, in fact, through FY 1979 remained far behind the established goals. The chief of the recruiting division in headquarters, Captain Depperman, recently highlighted the current state of affairs in minority officer recruiting by stating that "progress toward a racially balanced officer corps is agonizingly slow" [Depperman, 1979].

b. Advertising

Nevertheless, today the Coast Guard is very active in recruiting for black officers. This intense recruiting effort is primarily directed at both black high school students and black college students to encourage applications to the Coast Guard Academy and Officer Candidate School, respectively. The Coast Guard currently has recruiters in the field who are

assigned to recruit solely for minorities. Assisting their effort is a fairly comprehensive advertising campaign designed to increase minority awareness of the Coast Guard Academy and the Coast Guard in general. This includes spending an average of \$150,000 a year advertising in such minority magazines as EBONY, JET, BLACK ENTERPRISE, DAWN, and NUESTRO. The Coast Guard also purchases advertising spots on minority radio stations and last February (79) aired a 60 second T.V. advertisement during "Roots: The Next Generation." Another set of advertisements appear in college placement publications at selected institutions with high minority enrollment. The listing of these advertisements are often timed to appear just before the arrival of a Coast Guard recruiter on campus. Extensive use of black Coast Guard personnel appearing in recruiting posters, brochures, magazines advertisements, and television advertisements is standard practice, although advertising in general is racially balanced.

c. Goals and Milestones

The future goals and milestones for the minority recruiting effort are listed below. They are not broken down by race or ethnic group; the figures simply represent a minimum desired minority population in the Coast Guard with an ultimate goal of 18 percent reflecting the current minority population in the nation:

GOALS AND MILESTONES

Fiscal Year:	79	80	81	82	83	84	85
Officer Minority commissioning rate:	6%	8%	10%	12%	14%	16%	18%

The desired admission rate for minority Coast Guard Academy cadets is equivalent to the officer minority commissioning goals [Coast Guard Minority Military Recruiting Plan].

These goals and timetables clearly reflect the intent of present legislation. The Coast Guard, in establishing goals and milestones affecting the officer corps could have selected numerical objectives which reflected the availability of sufficient qualified applicants. Thus, the percentages could have been far lower than present target percentages since the minority representation in available labor market pools (e.g., blacks among managers, blacks with bachelors degrees, blacks in the upper 10% of their high school class) is less than the black percentage in the population [HUMMRO-Tech. Report; Bates, 1973]. However, the interim goals or targets for previously excluded groups is permitted to exceed their current representation in the available labor force so that long term goals may be reached in a reasonable period of time [Title 29 CFR]. Besides, the available qualified pool for selection to the officer corps is one that has been artificially restricted as a result of what Congress has called the "complex

and pervasive" nature of systemic discrimination against minorities. As a result, Congress as well as the courts have encouraged voluntary affirmative action which may consider race, sex, and/or National origin in making selections from among qualified or qualifiable applicants in order to achieve established goals [Interpretive Guidelines January 19, 1979 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION APPROPRIATE UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, AS AMENDED].

d. Organization

The recruiting organization in the Coast Guard is led by a Captain who runs the recruiting division in Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C. The division includes a staff of approximately eight officers. One of these officers is designated the minority program administrator. Another officer fills a billet which is responsible for overseeing minority advertising. The remaining officers, although not assigned directly to minority recruiting, assist the minority recruiting effort in a variety of ways due to the emphasis and priority that minority recruiting has received. Briefly stated, the recruiting division in headquarters places heavy emphasis and attention on minority recruiting.

In the field, each Coast Guard district in the continental United States has an officer recruiter who recruits solely for minority officers. Each of these recruiters is responsible to the district recruiting branch chief. Thus, there are two officers in each district specifically assigned to recruiting duties. Essentially, they work under a simple

matrix system. The recruiting branch is responsible to the Captain in headquarters (G-PMR) for achieving their goals. However, most of the officer recruiters are also assigned collateral duties in the district unrelated to recruiting, to training of some sort. Their performance evaluations are written by the Chief of Personnel within their own district. Simply put, in the districts the officer recruiters' primary responsibilities are monitored by the staff side of the Coast Guard organization while their performance evaluations are written by the line side of the Coast Guard organization which has no responsibility over recruiting goals. For example, the line organization in the district, from the district commander on down, is unaffected by success or failure in the effort to recruit a black officer. This is different from private industry practice. Typically, private industry places a recruiting field staff under line control and can thereby hold the line responsible for results [Northrup, 1974]. Incidentally, of the ten officer recruiters who currently recruit for minorities in the districts, two are black.

Apart from this organization in recruiting is a separate recruiting effort which operates from the Coast Guard Academy in New London, Connecticut. The thrust of this effort is aimed specifically at increasing the number of qualified minority applicants to the Coast Guard Academy. A Coast Guard commander is chief of the recruiting division in the admissions office and he has four officer recruiters assigned to him. Each officer is assigned to recruit in one of four regions in

the country. Their responsibility, with rare exception, is to recruit for minorities. When they travel to their own regions, they often coordinate their efforts with the local district recruiting offices. Of the four recruiters one is black [CDR Hickey, 1979].

e. Programs

Part and parcel to the minority recruiting effort are several programs which assist in this endeavor. The academy has a mail out program which contacts "qualified" minorities and informs these potential candidates about the academy. The academy also contacts various military and civilian "sponsors" who are willing to follow up and provide additional information to minority applicants to the academy [LT Hertz, 1979].

A third program the academy is engaged in is called "MITE" (Minority Introduction to Engineering). Minority high school students, mostly from the Northeast, are brought to the academy for a week's visit. The orientation emphasizes the engineering aspects of the academy's curriculum and involves each of the students in an engineering project. Although many of the "Mite" students apply to the academy, none has ever qualified for admission due to low college board scores [LCDR Smith, 1979].

Another program used by the Academy to try and increase its minority participation is BOOST (Broadened opportunity for officer selection and training). BOOST is a Navy prep school in San Diego which provides a concentrated 15

month curriculum in high school and freshman college subjects in an environment similar to the academies. Students at BOOST are young enlisted men and women who demonstrate potential for being accepted at a service academy [Shook, 1979].

At its inception in 1973 BOOST was an affirmative action program but it since has been made available to all applicants, majority and minority. The result was that last year the Navy dropped down to a 14% enrollment. The Defense Equal Opportunity establishment this year has required the Navy to enroll a minimum of 60% minority. Whether the Coast Guard will follow suit is unknown at this point. The Coast Guard began using BOOST in 1977 having received ten billets per year by special permission of the Chief of Naval Operations. The Coast Guard has averaged about a 30% minority enrollment each year. In the past three years six blacks have been sent to BOOST by the Coast Guard. Of the six, one was selected for appointment to the Coast Guard Academy but has since resigned. Senior Chief Shook, an administrator at BOOST, complains that the Coast Guard Academy does not take into adequate consideration the training the BOOST students receive. His argument is that the BOOST students' original high school rank is being used in the determination of the first cut scores and knocking them out of contention before their BOOST record is considered. He feels that the BOOST candidates should be given some kind of special consideration in the admissions process at the Coast Guard Academy. For example, the Naval Academy's normal cutoff on the college boards is 520 verbal/600 math but

the BOOST cutoff for serious consideration to the Naval Academy is 450 verbal/500 math [Shook, 1979].

The most recent program the Coast Guard Academy has become involved in to increase its minority participation is the Naval Academy Prep School in Newport, Rhode Island. The Navy has provided the Coast Guard with approximately 15 billets each year. The Coast Guard Academy intends to select highly promising civilian minorities who barely missed appointments to the Academy for this additional year of specialized training. Academy officials are especially keen on this program and expect it to increase black participation in the cadet corps [Capt. Randle , 1979].

In terms of the overall minority officer recruiting effort, the recruiting division in headquarters sponsors an annual seminar on minority officer recruiting. The purpose of the seminar is to bring together those involved in minority officer recruiting to exchange information on recruiting techniques and to plan better recruiting strategies.

f. Environment

For the most part, explaining the poor results in black representation in the officer ranks the prevailing view both in headquarters and at the academy is that the pool of qualified candidates for OCS and the academy is so limited, and the competition for these qualified candidates is so intense, that it provides an extremely difficult challenge to acquire black officers in the Coast Guard. The competition for these qualified blacks comes from both the civilian sector, where

affirmative action is practiced in earnest along with attractive starting salaries, and from the other armed services which enjoy better visibility and awareness from the public than does the Coast Guard. Coupled with this is the fact that the Youth Attitude Tracking Study, a document prepared for the Department of Defense, indicates a declining interest in America's youth to join the services [Depperman, 1979]. Any propensity for blacks to lose interest in joining the services would of course sharply exacerbate the already difficult black officer recruiting problem. In particular, one problem the Coast Guard faces is that it still has a poor reputation in the minority community.

It is generally considered that the Coast Guard is not well known in the minority community and, where we are known, our image as an equal opportunity employer is less than favorable. We are viewed by many as a white elitist organization, no doubt, because over the years our ranks have included so few minorities and none in high level, visible, positions. Our low profile among minorities is considered to be our biggest obstacle. [Coast Guard Military Minority Recruiting Plan]

g. Recruiters

And finally, in looking at the present state of recruiting, we turn to the recruiters themselves. Eventually, practically every recruiter for black officers gets frustrated. There is pressure on them to find the "qualified" black. In their own minds they often recruit black talent that they feel is qualified and capable of performing successfully at the Academy or OCS. However, all too often, these candidates are rejected as they do not meet the high selection criteria.

Any innovativeness the recruiters display is played down; they often become tasked with other unrelated responsibilities; and most frustrating, they find little success for their hard work. Competing against private enterprise for the "qualified" black also poses a difficult challenge. The Coast Guard black officer recruiter does not have the power to give jobs, only promises of what the future might bring. The private sector recruiter can often promise the job. The Coast Guard recruiter talks about a rigid and demanding selection process, interviews, time delays, etc. Private enterprise recruiters offer the job now with a more attractive starting salary. After a year or two working in this environment, where it is difficult to find success, frustration is altogether common [LT Sapp, 1979]. "A lack of positive motivation and commitment among recruiting personnel and other Coast Guard individuals and their commands is viewed as a large factor to be overcome. Collectively the Coast Guard has improved substantially in this area in the recent past but many, particularly minorities, believe there is significant room for improvement" [Coast Guard Military Minority Recruiting Plan].

h. Outlook

Regarding the future, Captain Depperman feels that achieving the Coast Guard's goals in minority recruiting is linked to increasing the minority population awareness of the Coast Guard and its opportunities. And in general "to improve officer recruitment will require continued emphasis on proven

management techniques and sustained dedication, innovation, funding, and support at all levels" [Depperman, 1979].

Recently, as a result of poor progress in Coast Guard minority and female officer recruiting, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provided the funding for 25 additional billets to emphasize minority and female recruiting. These billets may consist of civilians or military personnel. Semi-annual reports are required back to OMB indicating the Coast Guard's progress in this area [Chief of Staff memo 7100 dtd 29 Nov. 1978].

Another effort to step up minority enrollment in the officer corps has recently been undertaken. The Office of Personnel is in the process of establishing a consulting group to assist the academy in examining its admissions procedures. The consulting group will be led by RADM Lythcott, USPHS (ret.) and will be composed of members who have had past experience in raising minority representation at academic institutions [RADM W.H. Stewart, 1979].

4. Selection

How does the Coast Guard select its officers into the officer corps? Currently there are six primary sources of entry for prospective Coast Guard officers. The majority of officers enter the corps each year as a result of graduation from the Coast Guard Academy. The expected number in each graduating class largely determines the number of officers that will enter through other sources. The desired breakdown for non academy accessions is as follows:

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

1. Maritime academy graduates (direct commissioning):

8%

2. Prior service aviators (direct commissioning):

10%

3. Direct commission lawyers:

4%

4. Active Duty enlisted:

16%

5. Officer Candidate School:

60%

6. Other:

2%

The total number of officers entering each year is basically determined from a stochastic officer simulation model. Inputs to the model include the numbers of expected vacancies that will occur in each of the officer communities, Academy class sizes, total number of authorized billets, et al. The output of the model is the number of officers desired for the various programs [Lanterman, 1979].

a. Coast Guard Academy

Appointments to the Coast Guard Academy are offered to individuals who successfully compete in competitive examinations and meet certain general requirements for eligibility. Each applicant is required to take either the College Entrance Examination Board (CEEB) or the American College Test (ACT).

These tests account for 30% of the weighting factors. Another 30% is the high school rank. These two account for 60% of the weighting, and are the fixed weighting factors in the admissions process. In order for a candidate to be eligible for further consideration in the admissions process he or she must score a minimum of 3000 points on the fixed factors. ACT and high school rank are converted to a score on a 200-800 scale, similar to the CEEB. The first cut is determined by multiplying the math score by two, the English score by one, and the high school rank by three. Thus, the maximum score is 4800 since the highest individual score is an 800 [LT Hertz, 1979].

. The remaining 40% of the admissions process for those who make the first cut is determined by a cadet evaluation board composed of volunteer officers who are assigned at the Coast Guard Academy. Operating in teams of three, each team member individually evaluates a candidates entire record, including the results of the competitive examinations and high school rank. Underlying this evaluation is the "whole man" concept. The officers are given guidance in written form to assist them in their evaluations. Essentially, their evaluations should reflect their opinion of the candidates future potential as a cadet and officer with special emphasis on leadership qualities. These officers may be heavily influenced by the fixed factors available to them in the record. They may also be favorably influenced by strong letters of recommendation, the earning of varsity letters in

athletics, participation in extra-curricular activities, steady employment, etc. Generally, the officers will score the candidate favorably if the record indicates signs of initiative, motivation, and leadership [LCDR Smith, 1979; LT Hertz, 1979], unless the fixed factors appear too low. Occasionally, the board will find a letter in a candidate's file from either the Director of Admissions, athletic coaches, or both. This is an additional source of influence which can carry a lot of weight. In the case of the Director of Admissions, it reflects a long process of recruiting, follow-up and analysis of a minority candidate. Captain Getman, the director of admissions, will weigh heavily the recruiter's opinion of the attributes and qualities of the minority candidate. If the minority candidate was part of Project MITE, Captain Getman will have received additional information from members in the engineering department about the capabilities of the candidate as a result of their observations of the student doing his engineering project. Informally, Captain Getman will have acquired substantial information on minority applicants. Armed with this additional information Captain Getman makes a decision about each marginal minority candidate as to whether he will endorse this candidate with his own personal letter. The influence of this letter can be substantial, especially since the evaluation board is aware of the enormous effort and difficulty involved in recruiting qualified minority candidates for the Coast Guard Academy [LT Hertz, 1979].

Once the evaluation process is complete and the candidates have successfully met the other general requirements, they are all rank ordered and appointments are tendered by order of merit. Meeting the other general requirements include passing a comprehensive physical exam; passing a physical aptitude exam; reflect certain moral character; be unmarried; meet certain height and age criteria; and have sufficient minimal credits in prescribed high school subjects. There are no waivers of educational or physical requirements [Title 33 CFR part 40].

The 3000 point cutoff for the first cut was established by the former Director of Admissions, Captain Malcolm Williams. It reflected his view, based on studies he performed, as to what a reasonable cutoff for predicted successful performance at the Coast Guard Academy should be. For the cadet classes of 1981 and 1982 this cutoff was raised to 3200 points since applications had increased and the competition was keener. It also meant looking at less numbers of records. But since only two blacks were admitted to each of these classes, the cutoff was lowered back to 3000 points [LCDR Smith, LT Hertz, 1979].

b. Officer Candidate School

Civilians applying for Officer Candidate School must have a college degree. Those interested in applying to OCS must take the officer qualification test, OQT, a 90 minute exam. If they pass the OQT and meet certain other

basic requirements, an interview and a physical exam are arranged. At the interview an appraisal of each applicant's potential as a commissioned officer is determined by a board of three commissioned officers. Found physically qualified, the candidate's interview results, his completed application, and the OQT test results are forwarded to Commandant (G-PMR), the recruiting division, for evaluation. Those found qualified by Commandant (G-PMR) are then placed on a competitive selection list. The placement on this list is derived from a matrix using the OQT score on one axis and college grade point and experience factors on the other axis. Using a 0 to 10 scale, the maximum score a candidate could achieve would be 10,10.

Selection boards are convened twice yearly. The board consists of three officers all from the recruiting division and is chaired by the chief of officer recruiting. The process for selection is not based on a strict merit system. There are no hard and fast rules for selection; the board is flexible in whom they may choose. The only external influence the board receives is an input from the office of officer personnel indicating how many officers with engineering backgrounds are desired. Since the board is composed of officers from the recruiting division it is acutely aware of the Commandant's intentions for minority representation, and the board is aware of which candidates are minority candidates. If the board feels that it has not selected enough minority candidates it will generally reach below its own arbitrary

cut-off in order to insure adequate minority representation of those selected [Capt. Depperman, 1979]. The entire list, including those not selected, is then forwarded to the chief of the recruiting division who approves the final selection list [LT Mitchell, 1979].

Incidentally, the OQT has been determined to be culturally biased and the Coast Guard has recently adopted the use of the OAR, a Navy developed exam which is considered more fair [Fry, 1979].

c. Direct Commissioning

The officers who enter the Coast Guard by way of direct commissioning are required to have a specialty background in which the Coast Guard is interested. These specialties are law, aviation (prior service), and graduates of maritime academies. Each applicant must submit to an interview by a board of three Coast Guard officers, one of whom is a lieutenant or above. Letters of recommendation are also required and these letters accompany the basic application which includes listing the college(s) attended and a transcript of college grades. Direct commission applicants are not required to take an entrance examination.

Each year selection boards convene, by specialty, to review the records of the respective applicants. The board is composed of six officers and is chaired by a Coast Guard captain who possesses the same background specialty. At least two other officers on the board must have the same specialty, and at least three of the officers must hold reserve commissions [LT Mitchell, 1979].

An officer from PMR (recruiting division) briefs each board as to the numbers to be selected and insures the board members understand the Commandant's intentions on minority representation in the Coast Guard. The board is also briefed by an officer from the officer personnel division on the kinds of backgrounds desirable within the speciality, e.g., admiralty law, fixed wing experience, etc., [LT Mitchell, 1979]. Those candidates selected report to OCS for a brief indoctrination.

In general the pool of black candidates for direct commissioning is extremely small. The numbers of blacks with law degrees, prior service aviation experience, and maritime academy degrees is so low that the Coast Guard cannot expect to increase its black representation in the officer ranks via direct commissioning in these specialties.

d. Prior Enlisted

All enlisted men in the Coast Guard desiring to attend OCS must attain a minimum qualifying score on the OQT. In addition they must (1) hold a college degree or (2) have attained a qualifying score on the Dantes General Examination of the College Level Examination Program or (3) have completed one year of study at an accredited college and demonstrate minimum proficiency in first year college level math.

Unless they have a college degree, enlisted men applying to OCS must have four years of active service. They also must meet certain general requirements, in some instances more liberal than for civilians applying to OCS, and be

interviewed by a board of three officers. Included in their application for OCS must be an evaluation from their current commanding officer regarding their potential value as a commissioned officer [Coast Guard Personnel Manual, CG-207, 1-B-5]. The specific requirements for submitting the application can be found in the CG Personnel Manual.

Historically, the Coast Guard has not been able to send many black enlisted men through OCS. But unlike the direct commissioning situation, the immediate future holds more promise for increasing black participation in the officer ranks through the enlisted ranks since more blacks can be found in the enlisted ranks than before.

e. Published Results

The statistical data readily available in the Coast Guard on black officers is not sufficiently aggregated in one location where someone can easily begin to evaluate black officer progress. In many instances data on black officers is not kept or not easily recoverable. One main difficulty with acquiring statistical data on black officers is the fact that certain statistics are kept for minorities but not broken down for individual sub-groups. Appendix C is a collection of statistics garnered from various Coast Guard divisions. One statistical breakdown shows the number of minority officer accessions by program sources. But, for example, it fails to reveal the number of black officers entering from each source. In checking with the Recruiting Division, which published this commissioning status, it was

found that this information was not compiled [LT Mitchell, 1979]. The number of blacks extending or integrating into the Coast Guard was not readily available either. The integration and extension statistics in Appendix C was developed by LCDR Juan T. Salas, USCG, for his own interest and then published [LCDR Salas, 1979]. They do not include statistics on blacks. Beginning with 1978 the recruiting statistics do indicate the number of black entering cadets at the Coast Guard Academy. The Coast Guard Academy does publish statistics on the number of minority applications received, minority appointments tendered, minorities sworn in each year, and the number of minorities on board. This is shown in Appendix C but it is not broken down into subgroups. (The note at the bottom of that page was obtained by calling the academy for those additional statistics.) Statistics on blacks being assigned to command or to advanced training are not routinely published.

In general it appears difficult for top management to know exactly how black officers are faring in the Coast Guard. This stems in part perhaps from a lack of resources to perform the task of collecting and aggregating all the statistical data necessary to evaluate black officer progress.

5. Assignment Policy

As of August 1979, the officer assignment branch in the Coast Guard had no special written policy, affirmative action guideline, or strategy regarding black officers. However, certain pressures and demands existed as to how some

black officers would ultimately be affected in their assignments. These pressures and demands on the assignment officers sprung from three sources. The recruiting division in headquarters was relying on having black officers to assist in the black recruiting effort. Their philosophy was that a black officer is needed in order to recruit a black, a philosophy not altogether illogical. As a result of this expressed need by recruiting, blacks have been assigned to recruiting in disproportionate numbers over the years. Within the past year the Office of Civil Rights (G-H) indicated to officer personnel that what black officers require are "visible line" jobs, otherwise their upward mobility may be limited. Consequently, the detailer who is in charge of administrative assignments is caught in a minor conflict. The Civil Rights Office wants black officers in visible line jobs, the Recruiting Division feels it needs black officers to recruit blacks, and adding to the squeeze is an internal policy to assign black officers to the Coast Guard's large training commands. Interest in having black officers assigned to training commands stems from the apparent felt need to have black officers at the various entry points in the Coast Guard, i.e., Cape May Training Center, Alameda Training Center, Officer Candidate School in Yorktown, Va., and the U.S. Coast Guard Academy in New London, CT. There are also several billets where it is "advisable" to have a black officer assigned (e.g., Office of Public Affairs and the Office of Civil Rights) [Hindle, 1969].

Considering the small numbers of black officers available for assignment and the lack of a specific affirmative action strategy in assignments, the present demands for having black officers assigned to a particular job are in some cases driving the assignment decision, even though the assignment officers want to give the individual officer's preference card a high priority. Another influence in this process is that, from time to time, minority officers are solicited for certain assignments (e.g., recruiting duty) through the Commandant's Bulletin.

Discussions with the other assignment officers who detail officers to sea duty, certain types of shore duty, and engineering billets revealed that they do not have to nor do they take account of color in their assignment procedures. Their principle guideline, especially for command, is "best qualified" [LCDR Hamblin; LCDR Mercier; LCDR Karnis, 1979].

The lack of an affirmative action strategy in assignments, in this author's opinion, recently came back to haunt the Coast Guard. This past summer, two women were selected for command of a WPB (an 82' or 95' patrol craft). No blacks were selected. The women fully met the criteria for selection. A young black officer who had asked for a WPB and was clearly qualified for command was assigned instead to a staff position where a "felt need" for a black officer in this assignment existed. The one black officer relieved another black officer. Clarifying this assignment, there is a policy guidance in existence for command selection to a WPB. Essentially it

requires that selectees should be consistently strong performers from the top forty percent of their year group. In the rank ordering based on fitness reports and consistent with a "best qualifier" policy, the black officer missed getting selected for command by only a few places. The detailer pointed out that there were many officers below the black officer who were also qualified for command [LCDR Hamblin, 1979]. The point here is that if affirmative action had been a part of officer assignment policy, a young black officer would have had a greater probability of being selected for command. He might have received the visible line job providing him with operational experience which is so valuable to upward mobility. Notwithstanding this issue, the publicity of having two women and one or more black officers assigned to command would have been a real plum. Instead the Coast Guard lost a real opportunity. The assignment of two women to command and no blacks created disillusionment and discontent within the black officer community. This latter impression was based on several conversations with black Coast Guard officers [Personal observation].

6. Promotions

Promotion boards in the Coast Guard are required to select officers on the basis of a "best qualified" promotion system, without regard to race, color, religion, national origin or sex.

Under a fully qualified selection, each officer is compared against a standard, and all who exceed the standard are recommended. In a best

qualified system, the boards are limited to a specific number they may select. Accordingly, in addition to the fully qualified standard, the board must also make selections based on the comparison of each officer with all others considered. This procedure permits the board to select from the entire group the limited number whom they feel are the best qualified. [CG Personnel Manual (CG-207), Sect. 14 A]

Each board is flexible to determine its own criteria standard for selection but the basic criteria used is generally the same, except that the degree of significance associated with different factors may differ with respect to different ranks and from board to board. The basic criteria is considered to be:

- 1) Performance of duties
- 2) Personal qualities
- 3) Education

Each board is briefed by an officer from the office of Personnel on applicable laws, regulations, and the needs of the service. Each member of a personnel board is required to evaluate impartially and fairly the fitness of each officer whose name is submitted to the board [CG Personnel Manual (CG 207, Sect. 14)].

A recent change to the promotion policy has affected the composition of the promotion boards. The change requires that each board be composed of representation from all groups. This change was designed to reflect sensitivity on the part of Coast Guard policy and in essence sends a signal which represents concern over equal opportunity issues [RADM W.H. Stewart, 1979]. Summary sheets of the promotion boards now

include statistics on the number of women and blacks selected [LT Vaughn, 1979].

a. Performance Appraisal

Turning to performance appraisal in general we find that studies [Senger, 1971; Beatty, 1976] show that supervisors tend to evaluate performance of subordinates on criteria separate from job performance. The criteria actually used is usually more socially related than task related and is often dependent on the nature of the supervisor's beliefs, attitudes, and values.

In the Open and Closed Mind Milton Rokeach presents a theory of prejudice as a function of similarity and dissimilarity of beliefs held or perceived to be held between people, instead of it being some deep rooted psychological phenomenon. Rokeach states that:

Belief is more important than ethnic or racial membership as a determinant of social discrimination. Our theory leads us to propose that what appears at first glance to be discrimination among men on the basis of race or ethnic group may turn out upon closer analysis to be discrimination on the basis of belief congruence over specific issues.
[Rokeach, 1960]

In general, Rokeach makes the point that the person discriminated against is practically a "total stranger" to the person doing the discriminating. White people have a reluctance to inquire into the beliefs of blacks and therefore do not know if their beliefs are congruent or not. As a result, whites, especially the more closed-minded, assume that the black possesses beliefs, attitudes, values, and

personalities different from his own. The more this perception is believed to be true, the more he rejects the black person, and the more likely he is to evaluate the black's performance on the degree of difference in beliefs rather than on objective performance criteria [Rokeach, 1960].

Richard Beatty examined the problem of performance appraisal in a study which focused on a training program for the development of black supervisors. His results indicated that employers tended to evaluate minority performance on factors unrelated to program content or task related behaviors. Instead performance was largely rated on other behaviors black supervisors demonstrated while at work. More specifically, they were rated to a great extent on their social behaviors. Thus, Beatty concluded that it is essential for a black supervisor to be aware of the impact that his/her personal and interpersonal attributes may have upon an employer [Beatty, 1976].

Consistent with Beatty's findings is an article written by John Senger suggesting that evaluations are composed largely of the value orientations of the evaluator. And, according to Senger, the higher one climbs in the organization the more similar his values tend to be with those of the present leadership. This exacerbates the promotional difficulties for blacks since, as already alluded to by Rokeach, their values are often perceived as different from those of whites, whether they are or not. Senger further highlights the problem with evaluations by describing the common perception of

evaluations in modern organizations as being based on objective and fair analysis. Thus, the dilemma for a black person can be particularly complex. On the one hand he feels frustrated and angry for not being promoted, while on the other hand he is not sure why he was not selected [Senger, 1971].

Shedding additional light for the appreciation of the complex situation a black person can become placed into is Abraham Zaleznik who wrote in The Human Dilemmas of Leadership the following:

The anxiety experienced by the upwardly mobile individual largely comes from internal conflicts generated within his own personality. On the one hand, there is the driving and pervasive need to prove himself as assurance of his adequacy as a person; on the other hand, the standards for measuring his adequacy come from sources somewhat unfamiliar to him. [Zaleznik, 1966]

This discussion on evaluation centers on a problem that performance appraisal systems have had to cope with for a long time. The need for relevant selection and performance criteria is gaining added impetus but there still exists a very large subjective component in evaluating subordinates. Consequently, blacks may suffer more from this fact than do whites because they often spring from a different culture and may have different values than their usually white supervisors.

Supporting the thesis that blacks may be evaluated differently than whites at the officer level was a statistical analysis done by the Department of Defense.

Finally, the impact of performance evaluations on minority officers' eligibility rates, as compared with those of nonminority officers, has now been evaluated. H. Minton Francis, deputy assistant secretary of defense, has made public the results of a 1975 computer analysis showing that black officers consistently received performance marks five to ten points lower than their white counterparts. These evaluations, used as a basis for periodic reductions in the services' officer corps and a key factor in promotion, affect retention. The present trend of lower performance marks for minority officers has clear and obvious implications for future minority officer retention. It is extremely important that racial bias not enter into these subjective evaluations. The results of the above study indicate that the need for continued effort and, possibly, increased emphasis on the services' human relations programs are needed. [Northrup, 1979]

The Coast Guard has not examined their officer performance data to see if any significant differences exist between white and black evaluations [RADM W.H. Stewart, 1979].

7. Civil Rights Training

All Coast Guard military personnel are required to receive the Coast Guard standardized civil rights training program. This training consists of at least four separate blocks of civil rights information and is designed to extend and improve training heretofore received in the sixteen hour (two day) standardized package. The current training is 8 hours (one day) in duration, but may be extended with additional training blocks if the commanding officer so desires. The training is to be conducted only by individuals who have successfully completed training at the Defense Race Relations Institute, Patrick Air Force Base, Florida.

(DRRI conducts training for armed forces personnel and civilian employees in the area of human/race relations and equal opportunity. Within the past year DRRI's curriculum has been revised and it now emphasizes organization development theory and techniques in training their student facilitators in equal opportunity.)

The eight hours of training begins with an "orientation" block which covers discrimination complaint procedures. This block is mandatory. Optional training blocks which the CO may choose from include "Basic Human Awareness," "Women in the Coast Guard," "Military Rights and responsibilities," et al. Training is typically conducted in groups of between 20 and 25 people [COMDTINST 5354.4 dtd 11 April 1979].

Besides the formalized Coast Guard wide civil rights training, individual commands develop their own human relations training programs. These programs are guided by unit and district instructions, supported by the District Military Affirmative Action Plan and the Coast Guard Civil Rights Manual.

B. FUTURE STATE

1. General Policy

a. Affirmative Action

Unless Affirmative Action is taken to correct past discriminatory action and their effects and eliminate present procedures which limit full participation by members of minority groups major manpower concerns will develop with respect to participation by minorities. [Edward Scarborough, Defense Manpower Commission Staff, 1976]

The Coast Guard needs a realistic affirmative action policy in the 1980's which will provide for a substantive, results-producing program in the officer ranks. The present and past equal opportunity and affirmative action policies have not gone far enough. Unfortunately, they yielded little change in the racial composition of the officer corps. A tough, aggressive recruiting posture is not enough. Policies of non-discrimination and "equal" treatment alone have not and will not produce the necessary and appropriate change required by the intent of the courts, legislation, and executive orders with respect to affirmative action.

Maintaining those policies over the recent years had anticipatable consequences. The Coast Guard, in casting its affirmative action program in such an unrealistic and veiled existence, was bound not to succeed. Those policies will continue to be insufficient unless a major change in Coast Guard affirmative action policy occurs.

The Coast Guard must make necessary adjustments to its affirmative action stance if it is to meet the demands of the next decade.

What is certain is that some organizations will correctly identify the requirements for change which the future will impose. Others will not. By identifying those requirements and by initiating the first stages of an analysis of their consequences for his or her corporation, a manager may help the organization to be one of those companies which masters, and is not mastered by, the 1980's. [Mills, 1979]

Right now is a serious time for affirmative action. More vocal groups, pro and con, are developing. Legal concerns reflected in the Bakke and Weber Supreme Court cases over quotas and goals, reverse discrimination, and questions of fairness continue to surface. "The full benefits of affirmative action may be a long time in coming" [Sargent, 1978].

Regarding the future, Warren Bennis has stated that there are six major human problems which must be addressed in the next twenty-five years: integration, distribution of power, collaboration, adaptation, identity and revitalization. "How organizations cope with and manage these tasks will undoubtedly determine the viability of the enterprise" [Bennis, 1968].

Top leadership in the Coast Guard must recognize that it is time for a new and different approach in the strategy used to increase black participation in the officer corps. Top leadership must adopt strong affirmative action policies relative to the officer corps. It must acknowledge that "affirmative action programs are a means for effecting social change and that their designers intended precisely that. Then let management acknowledge that all social change produces conditions of stress, resistance, and counterpressures, which we sum up in the odious word 'backlash' and that this is bound to happen. Having said these things openly instead of swaddling them in bland abstractions, management will say, pointedly, that disagreements with the direction, form, or pace of social change represented by an affirmative action

program can not be an excuse for inaction in carrying out the program" [Blodgett, 1972].

The Commandant must take a more active, positive, and personal approach to bring affirmative action to force. He must provide emotional support and it must be evident to blacks in the organization. They need to know that it is more than just a paper policy, business as usual. Affirmative action in the officer corps must be made the top priority that was indicated by the former Secretary of Transportation, Brock Adams. To make affirmative action a top priority requires daring and brave decisions in policy changes that go to the very heart of racism.

Equal opportunity doesn't just happen, it comes about because managers make it happen. [President Ford, 8 March 1975]

As already indicated, pressures for equal opportunities continues to grow, but unless the Coast Guard makes the proper personnel decisions today, it will not have the right racial mix of people tomorrow in its higher level jobs. If the Coast Guard thinks it is in the business of training leaders of tomorrow, it must provide for the training of black leadership. Captain Getman, director of admissions at the Coast Guard Academy, said last year:

If we are ever going to have equal opportunity in the Coast Guard we need to have minority graduates of the academy in leadership positions. [N.Y. Times, July 30, 1978]

For this to happen, the Coast Guard has to develop a strategy which incorporates more than just a recruitment

goal. Affirmative action will not work if all that is done is to bring blacks to the Academy or OCS. The critical affirmative action strategy should address how you get increased numbers of blacks to graduate from the academy and OCS. At minimum a graduation goal is needed. For example, the dean and commandant of cadets at the Coast Guard Academy should both have objectives which stress and address affirmative action. Having a graduation goal would undoubtedly cost more (e.g., five year graduation plans, tutoring, interpersonal skills training, etc.). But having black officers in the Coast Guard in greater numbers would have both tangible and intangible value. For example the image of having increased numbers of black officers in the Coast Guard would have a positive effect on the entire equal opportunity climate.

b. Equal Treatment

In general it is very difficult to measure social concerns. At its roots are individual's beliefs and attitudes. Affirmative action programs are either viewed as providing equal opportunity or as providing reverse discrimination, depending on one's vantage point [Beusse, 1976].

From the very beginning some people understood that at the core of affirmative action was a policy of preferential treatment, and that to be fair may not be equal. The goal is equal opportunity and the rhetoric of "equal treatment" opposes affirmative action which is a way to bring about equal opportunity. Affirmative action is a matter of providing equal

opportunity in the short run so groups of individuals are competing equally in the long run.

The Coast Guard's current policy, as previously cited, argues for a strict application of "equal" treatment. Considering the complex definition of equality in terms of opportunity, what is equal treatment? Is equal treatment really equal? No matter how you slice it, the strict application of equal standards, at this point in our history, to all blacks and whites alike, would be a travesty of justice of major proportion. Wilhelm advances the notion that equal treatment is in fact discriminatory or facist. At first glance this may sound ridiculous. Yet his position challenges contemporary white efforts to have the best of both worlds - a superior position and the feeling that it has been meritoriously earned [Katz, 1976].

By enforcing uniform standards regardless of race 'no' discrimination against a person's race is involved. But the impression of fairness is achieved only by overlooking the fact that Negroes are not just like whites at the time of promotion. To be judged by criteria applicable to all persons irrespective of color when the Negro is extremely different can only mean the Negro will receive unequal treatment. To enforce equal standards to unequal individuals is to perpetuate inequality in the name of equality. [Wilhelm, 1971]

A tragic irony is unfolding before us. A significant segment of white society is belligerent toward being subjected to minority quotas or goals. How quickly forgotten are the quotas to which blacks were subjected to for so long. "White society successfully froze blacks out of universities;

froze blacks out of American professions; and froze blacks out of the mainstream of American economic and social life" [Jordan, 1974]. Vernon Jordan passionately argues for preferential admissions for blacks until such time as black people may be regarded as having achieved full access to the professions of American society. But now, in the name of "equality," blacks are all too often discovering that they are expected to break out of the vicious cycle of social and economic inequality on an "equal" basis.

Schuman (1969) reports a steady decrease in white American's belief in the doctrine of innate racial superiority vis a vis the doctrine of individual free will and choice. This assumes everyone can "make it" on their own if protestant ethic values are used. Schuman's research shows that this strongly held view interacts with white's growing understandings of the reality of racial injustice to create confused and ambivalent value stances. Perhaps this theory helps to explain other empirical findings that report that many white Americans appear to be pro-black but continue to advocate social actions and policies that foster racism.

[Katz, 1976]

No doubt, affirmative action goals will be difficult to implement if some whites are not to bear the historic injustice of the past.

How long must blacks wait before they have full access to the Coast Guard? According to the book Blacks in the Industrial World: Issues for the Manager, optimistic projections (judging from improvements at the end of the 1960s) for blacks to obtain their fair share of jobs as officials and managers will take 55 years, and as professionals will take 84 years [Blodgett, 1972].

For some blacks affirmative action is not needed, but for others it is. "How else do you overcome the amazing racial imbalance at the professional level shown by statistics? When rightly understood, preference is a dignified word and a justifiable practice" [Blodgett, 1972].

It is now well understood, however, that our society cannot be completely color-blind in the short run if we are to have a color-blind society in the long term. After centuries of viewing through colored lenses eyes do not quickly adjust when the lenses are removed. Discrimination has a way of perpetuating itself, albeit unintentionally, because the resulting inequalities make new opportunities less accessible. Preferential treatment is one partial prescription to remedy our society's most intransigent and deeply rooted inequalities. [Todorich and Glickstein, 1977]

c. Systems Approach

Having stated that affirmative action should be a strong partner with the equal opportunity program for Coast Guard officers, a succeeding proposal for the future state is that a comprehensive approach to equal opportunity and affirmative action should be instituted. In response to this approach, a Human Resource Management (HRM) System would provide the Coast Guard with a more effective means of selecting and utilizing its people. Captain Walden, the Deputy Chief, Office of Civil Rights, has already proposed that the Coast Guard study an "organizational development (OD)" program. Essentially, the object of the OD program would be to tie together the Coast Guard's various "human" programs in a unified systems approach (see Appendix D).

Relative to organizations' view of social responsibilities, Jay Nisberg sees three general deficiencies:

- 1) The lack of appropriate priority or emphasis on the management of human resources.
- 2) The lack of high quality programs covering selection, appraisal, individual development, career planning and other important factors in the management of people.
- 3) The lack of a set of overall objectives toward which organizations should be moving and a systematic plan for effecting change in the make-up of the organization. [Nisberg, 1975]

A unified systems approach to the most fundamental objective of managers - the acquisition and development of people - is needed, not only to meet social and legal obligations, but also to assure the future of your organization.

[Nisberg, 1972]

In general, the Coast Guard would be wise to look toward a total systems approach in the HRM area which includes significant attention to equal opportunity and affirmative action issues. Its present affirmative action strategy will not produce change, it will largely maintain the status quo. A total systems approach offers the hope of changing the present pattern which has suppressed black participation in the officer corps. The advantages of a systems approach have already been emphasized by the Commandant in his policy guidance of 30 March 1979.

2. Organizational Climate

The future climate of the Coast Guard should reflect a positive effort on the part of the Coast Guard to carefully monitor affirmative action programs. The future climate should also reflect a continuing effort in the Coast Guard

to search for new and creative ways to eliminate prejudice and promote harmony among groups of people whose skin color happens to be different. How is this to be done?

Warren Bennis stated that organization development rests on three basic premises. The first is based on the evolutionary principle that every age develops an organizational form appropriate to its genius, and that the process of change requires us to revitalize and rebuild our organizations. The second premise is that "the only real way to change organizations lies in changing the climate of the organization - the 'way of life,' a system of beliefs and values, an accepted form of interaction and relating." The third premise is that "a new social awareness is required by people in the organization" [Huse, 1975].

This calls for changes in the Coast Guard climate if affirmative action goals are to succeed. A number of variables impacting on affirmative action and equal opportunity need to be addressed. These included, but are by no means limited to, feelings, job satisfaction and characteristics, expectations, organizational barriers, commitments, beliefs, attitudes, and values.

a. Resistance

Changes in the climate of organizations, however, do not come about easily. Internally few forces are driving to change the system but many forces work against change. As Chris Argyris points out, "many individuals are so 'systematically blind' to their own behavior that they are 'culturally

programmed' to behave in ways that considerably reduce the probability of change" [Argyris, 1971]. Nevertheless, to continue to operate effectively organizations must adjust to rapid change. The Coast Guard's Civil Rights Program Outlook (1982-1986) encourages the Coast Guard to be responsive to the sociological needs of the society at large.

The present trend in sociological changes indicates a need to provide responsive leadership which relates to attitudinal changes of the population from which we employ. ... it is the area of sociological change which requires the Coast Guard to become more people-oriented and develop an increased sensitivity to social and humanitarian issues. [Coast Guard Office of Civil Rights' Program Plan Summary, 1979]

The future state demands that leadership in the Coast Guard be sensitive to the needs of blacks.

In general, there is a need to reemphasize race relations since there is mounting evidence that support for equal opportunity is on the decline. Interviews with minorities in the services indicates that they feel their services are backing off from their usual front running position in equal opportunity and race relations [Scarborough, 1976]. In particular, the Coast Guard must continue to research its own climate and determine what programs are necessary to insure viable and effective equal opportunity and affirmative action stances which reflect fairness and equity for all groups and individuals.

Concomitant with a decision to proactively adopt and support affirmative action, the Coast Guard must take steps

to insure that its officer corps is attitudinally prepared to accept greater numbers of black officers in the Coast Guard.

b. Objectives

One recognized approach for affecting attitudes is through training. Training (to be discussed in further detail later) must emphasize new attitudes and foster the appropriate links and bridges between whites and black which are vital to black upward mobility and development of their full potential. To begin, the Coast Guard needs to provide a climate where the black officer, upon entry to the Coast Guard, can expect the same treatment and upward mobility as any other officer. They should believe that if they apply themselves fully they will advance to the O-6 levels and above. Whites already have this expectation.

The Coast Guard has an obligation to even out the odds for blacks who have executive potential. From his own experience as a black executive in a large corporation, Edward Jones drew up the following as steps an organization could take to help combat the ineffectiveness of current equal opportunity efforts:

1) Unquestionable top management involvement and commitment. The top executives must have well thought out strategies, not lip service.

2) Direct two-way communications between top management and black trainees must be instituted to help counsel the potentially crippling paranoia away which blacks may feel on occasion from an insensitive white culture.

3) Appraisal of managers on their contribution to the company's equal opportunity objectives. Companies should use the appraisal system to make the welfare of the black trainee coincident with the well-being of his superior. Such action

will probably receive heavy resistance from middle managers and lower level managers. But managers are appraised on their abilities to reach important objectives; and more significantly, the inclusion of this area in appraisals signals to everyone involved that a company is serious! Failure to take this step signals business as usual and adds to any credibility gap between the company and black employees. Tying managers equal opportunity contributions to the appraisal system also motivates the trainee's superior to "school" him on the realities of the political process in the organization.

4) Avoid the temptation to create special showcase-black jobs. Line jobs provide experience and reality testing which develop confidence required in positions of greater responsibility.

5) Select assignments for the new black manager which are challenging, yet do not in themselves increase his chance of failure. [Jones, 1976]

Once the Coast Guard begins to increase its number of black officers, the achievement of these and similar objectives is the kind of organizational support critical to blacks to help them reach their potential.

To assist in determining which particular objectives need to be addressed and to help guide the future policy and decisions in equal opportunity and affirmative action, an ad hoc committee could be appointed. The committee would operate similar in nature to the Professional Military and Training Advisory Committee (PMTAC) which advises the Coast Guard Academy on its cadet military and professional training. The added support of a committee, sensitive to affirmative action goals, could provide further insight on developing a Coast Guard strategy surrounding equal opportunity and affirmative action issues to those officers and civilians already involved in equal opportunity. A commitment along these lines

is also a signal indicating the Coast Guard is serious about affirmative action.

Equal opportunity for black officers in the Coast Guard will not be achieved until top leadership recognizes the organizational, interpersonal, and intrapersonal barriers to change that exist in the Coast Guard. Identifying these barriers is as important as the black officer recruitment effort. This will require a particular effort aimed at diagnosing the present selection practices and work environment. Some of the areas that should be examined to determine if real or potential barriers to black officer upward mobility exist include:

- 1) Performance appraisal system
- 2) Career tracks and lines of progression
- 3) job requirements
- 4) supervisory attitudes and/or biases
- 5) employee resistance
- 6) peer and work group barriers
- 7) social barriers
- 8) psychological barriers [Albrecht and Hall, 1979]

Also relative to organizational climate, Neely and Luthans describe a "third phase" of affirmative action/equal employment opportunity (AA/EEO) that is necessary to achieve if an organization is to reach an effective, long lasting approach to AA/EEO. In their view, the third phase requires a planned change or organization development effort that results in the following:

- 1) The organization changes its human, interpersonal climate to one in which the unique contributions of minorities and women are sought and welcomed.
- 2) Management begins to share its decision-making power with minorities and women who are placed in positions of power and influence.

3) The organization accepts and affirms pluralistic values, styles, and standards, believing that it may experience a desirable synergistic effect as a consequence.

4) The organization ensures an equitable distribution of opportunities for advancement and growth, availability of resources, and rewards for accomplishments.

5) The organization adopts policies, programs, and practices that are flexible enough to be responsive to the needs of all, both inside and outside the organization.

Neely and Luthans argue that organizations must become more sensitive to the needs and values of their third phase AA/EEO objectives. They cite, as one of the most effective ways to reach their objectives, the organization development technique of survey feedback. Research has generally substantiated that timely-goal related feedback can improve performance and motivation toward the goals that are sought [Neely and Luthans, 1978].

c. Feedback

The U.S. Army has been using a management instrument known as RAPS - Racial Attitude and Perception Survey - to monitor the racial climate of their units. It has proved efficient and useful and they now have introduced an abridged version of the survey known as RAPS2. The important point is that the Army is using a survey to gain feedback on their racial climate and using this feedback to assist their commanders in overcoming racial discrimination problems and organizational barriers to minorities [O'mara, 1978].

In general, feedback data can be analyzed to identify barriers to goal attainment in affirmative action and equal opportunity. It can also be used to develop new ideas

toward goal attainment as well as determine where the system needs encouragement and who needs to be rewarded [Luthans and Neely, 1978]. Not only is a survey a good method for evaluating the equal opportunity climate, it also can serve as a valuable vehicle for increasing awareness of the affirmative action and equal opportunity issues. In order to improve the Coast Guard's performance in these areas with respect to officers, the Coast Guard needs to know more than the fact that it is deficient in some areas. It needs to know why, and survey feedback is one excellent way for increasing understanding and awareness.

d. Defensible Plan

In terms of the legal climate, the Coast Guard must have an effective, well developed and implemented affirmative action plan. Having a strong and defendable affirmative action plan is a good defense against litigation in the future. To support such a plan, top leadership must begin to build in the Coast Guard's budget an ever-growing commitment to the equality of opportunities and to the expansion of those opportunities within the Coast Guard. Special training programs, ROTC programs, etc., would surely add to the budget and be a cause for concern. But top leadership must reflect on the positive side which considers an enhanced public image, better community relations, higher black retention, and an overall feeling of being in an organization that is more fair and equitable.

e. Issues

But in the effort to "energize" the Coast Guard toward the full use and implementation of an affirmative action philosophy, there may be some inherent issues overlooked. One of these is the effect that affirmative action may have on the person who is hired as a result of affirmative action. Once a black feels that he or she has been hired only to fulfill government legal requirements, that person may begin to feel frustrated and angry. Every employee wants to feel valued by the organization for his or her own unique abilities. If this feeling is absent their spirit and motivation becomes reduced, the job becomes meaningless and they ultimately lose their own self-respect [Clark and Perlman, 1977]. But if a person knows he deserves his job because of merit, ability, and potential for success, that person will have the self-respect needed to perform well. The argument of reverse discrimination can be very counter-productive and deceptive in making people believe that only the "best qualified" are hired. One way of handling this problem is to emphasize to persons receiving preferential treatment that they would have been best qualified if they and their forefathers had not been victims of discrimination and injustice. Then, those blacks selected preferentially for admission to the Coast Guard officer corps can have "the appropriate and secure feeling that, whatever detractors may say, they are getting what they deserve" [Jones, 1977].

However, the burden to implement affirmative action is not entirely on the organization and its leadership. The black has an obligation too in the future state. He or she must be willing to exercise understanding and patience toward the organization and the efforts it is making. The black must assume that the organization is acting in good faith, unless proved otherwise, and show a lenient attitude toward it.

The individual must also acknowledge that the whole organization process is a process of building - building new attitudes, building new career paths and opportunities, and building a future of mutual trust and respect - and that building something of true strength and real equity takes a very long time.
[Clark & Perlman, 1977]

LT John Williams, USCG, said it well when he advised black officers to "get out there, develop the power of excellence, and use it to climb to the top. Develop short and long range goals. Become aware of the many educational programs available to increase your chances of success, both in the Coast Guard and out. Read the professional publications and become aware of trends within the Coast Guard, then request those assignments that are career enhancing" [LT Williams, 1979]. LT Williams has hit upon the implication for black responsibility once given the opportunity to develop themselves. The Coast Guard has to provide the opportunity. This much is owed blacks.

3. Recruiting

The task for future state officer recruiting is to somehow make the Coast Guard relatively more attractive to

blacks than it has appeared in the past. Present state recruiting revealed a vigorous recruiting effort but in examining its background, philosophy, and organization several new directions should be considered. However, it would be a poor assumption to think that the total solution to increasing black participation in the officer ranks can result from a revision in the recruiting strategy alone. Future state recruiting is certainly an important part of the whole systems approach in implementing affirmative action and needs to be pursued as forcefully as it is today. Affirmative action is not license to select unqualified candidates. The challenge to recruit highly capable black officer candidates to apply to the Coast Guard officer programs is still an instrumental part of affirmative action.

a. Pool of Candidates

Presently, the pool of potential black candidates is large and increasing. By 1980 it is expected to be 1.44 million blacks between the age of 17 and 21. This represents a 32% increase over 1970 [Hester, 1977]. But this has not made the Coast Guard's job any easier since the competition for the qualified black high school and college student is keener than ever before and demands an active recruiting policy.

Nevertheless, in future state recruiting the Coast Guard must begin to examine some of its own assumptions about the size and quality of the pool of potential

black candidates. For example, in 1971 there was a study produced by Fred Crossland which asserted that minorities scored about 1 deviation below the mean of the rest of the population on academic aptitude and achievement tests. This led to the conclusion by some that there were only about 1,200 black high school seniors who met the *prima facie* requirements for admission to the service academies. But Arthur Hester pointed out that there was little substantive evidence to support this figure. A temporary special admissions committee at West Point (1968-1976) determined that there were sufficient numbers of black students who were both capable and desirous of attending West Point. The first year it operated (1968) there was a five-fold increase in the number of black cadets at West Point and the following years saw a relatively stable number of blacks enter West Point. The special admissions committee was so successful that its function was institutionalized in 1972. It was disbanded in 1976 after having vastly increased the number of black cadets at West Point. One principal assumption it operated under was that the reported size and quality of the black pool was in error [Hester, 1977].

In 1979 only 1,827 black high school students were identified as eligible for admission to the Coast Guard Academy [Cheatham, 1979]. Limiting the Coast Guard's horizons to thinking that only 1,827 black high school students in America were academically eligible for the Coast

Guard Academy is counter-productive and almost ludicrous. "Academically eligible" is an absolutely fuzzy term. There may only have been 1,827 black high school seniors who satisfied some combination of test scores (it speaks nothing of high school rank, initiative, motivation, etc.) but there are thousands upon thousands of black students who are academically capable for admission to the Coast Guard Academy. For example, when the Coast Guard Academy rejects a black to the class of 1982 when his college board scores are 530 verbal, 620 math it is not rejecting "academically ineligible" blacks. It is rejecting an academically eligible black who, in this particular year, was not high enough on the rank ordered list of those selected.

What incentive does a recruiter have to recruit a black who has college board scores in the middle 500s and who may be highly capable and possess the other qualities (e.g. leadership) that the Coast Guard looks for when he or she realizes these scores do not normally make the cut? The recruiter is perhaps prone to thinking that this student is "academically ineligible." Future state recruiting calls for an examination of the Coast Guard's assumptions about the size and the quality of the pool of black candidates. Recruiters should be enthusiastic about recruiting those 1,827 superstars but they should feel equally enthusiastic about recruiting the thousands of other talented black high school students whose academic test scores reflect the

capability of meeting the academic requirements at the academy. Affirmative action would provide added incentive to the recruiting community since they would begin to see success for their efforts.

b. Personalized Approach

Another direction the Coast Guard should take in its recruiting strategy is to attempt to personalize its approach. More key people should be personally involved. According to Dr. Cheatham, a professor at the Coast Guard Academy who has researched the college recruiting climate, Georgia Tech. University enjoyed great success in its effort to recruit top flight black high school students. It was successful largely because the dean of admissions, the deans of the different schools, engineering, etc., and specifically assigned admissions counselors made special and personal contact with those students.

Just as Captain Otto Graham might call a highly sought after high school athlete, the Coast Guard's director of admissions, the dean, and even the superintendent might call or visit a potential black cadet and/or his parents. The extra attention could have substantial impact in attracting increased numbers of blacks to the Coast Guard Academy.

In regards to OCS, a district commander or one of his senior ranking officers could occasionally become similarly involved.

The idea of contact with the parents of the black student should be seriously considered in almost all cases.

The choice of college is influenced by several variables (e.g., friends, parents, relatives, teachers, guidance counselors, etc.). In a 1976 study on the Alabama freshman class it was found that blacks are influenced by their parents as to choice of college more so than any other factor. In contrast, whites were more influenced by their friends than their parents [Hester, 1977]. Parents certainly can appreciate the value of a service academy education. If personally contacted by the recruiter and senior Coast Guard officials, they may help the Coast Guard turn the corner on black recruiting. In short, don't just recruit the students, recruit the parents too! This strategy brings to mind "Lefty" Driesell, the basketball coach at the University of Maryland who is famous for his ability to recruit outstanding athletes. He has stated that the key to his success was developing a relationship primarily with the parents.

c. Training

Other future state considerations must include the training of the recruiters, the reward incentives, and the direction of their recruiting efforts. But even before the training element is considered, particular emphasis needs to be placed on selecting recruiters with personalities compatible with the "selling" aspect of their job. They must show special skill and aptitude for a recruiting assignment. To a degree this is done today, but the screening process could be more formalized.

In addition to present state training, which includes "salesmanship" the non-black recruiters must be made to feel comfortable when they recruit in largely black environments. This calls for special training in race relations (see Future State Civil Rights Training) and particular emphasis on civil rights legislation and affirmative action requirements. They too must understand the management of affirmative action. It seems plausible that a recruiter will spend time where he or she feels comfortable and making a non-black recruiter feel comfortable in a black environment may provide additional recruiting payoffs. Interestingly, many private companies insure that their recruiters are familiar with civil rights laws and practices [Northrup, 1974].

One favored recruiting technique in private practice has been the "I Spy" (from the television show) concept where two recruiters, a black and a white work together as a team. They both should have sound knowledge of the organization as well as the civil rights laws. And as serious recruiters both should be familiar with current problems and current thinking of blacks. This includes a familiarity with black literature [Calvert, 1972].

d. The Billet

Certainly the billets for officer recruiting must be made career enhancing, especially if the Coast Guard desires to continue having an emphasis on maintaining black officers as recruiters. The strategy of having a black officer representing the Coast Guard in a black community is still an

important recruiting consideration. But the officer should recruit in both black and other communities. Black officers should not be depended upon to bring in all and only blacks into the officer ranks. This would be hypocritical. However, blacks should feel that they occupy billets which can provide upward mobility. Perhaps this argues for making tours in recruiting more than a one shot occurrence. The Coast Guard could require repeat tours in recruiting and consider recruiting part of a human resource specialty. The specialty gives credibility and the repeat tours provide additional expertise for improving future recruiting.

e. Additional Sources

The question comes up occasionally as to where Coast Guard recruiters should be spending their time recruiting for black officers. Is the Coast Guard fishing in the wrong lake? Is it fishing in enough lakes? One senior Coast Guard officer thinks that the Coast Guard should be concentrating outside of urban centers and begin concentrating more in middle class American neighborhoods. Another pocket worth investigating is the junior college graduates.

Don't overlook the public community colleges--even though they may not normally be a major recruiting source. The majority of all new students entering public colleges today choose a two-year college. Some feel that the community colleges may be the single most important source of higher education for minority group students. One source indicates that 'a quarter of all black collegians are concentrated in public two-year colleges in three cities, New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. In virtually every large American city - Cleveland, St. Louis,

San Francisco, Philadelphia, Miami, Dallas - more blacks study at public community colleges than at all nearby institutions combined. [Calvert, 1972]

f. New Programs

Certainly paralleling the recruiting efforts for the academy and OCS should be the serious consideration of special programs. VADM Scarborough, the vice-commandant, and Captain Waldon like a concept similar to the Marine leadership school to bring blacks into the Coast Guard [Capt. Waldon, 1979]. ROTC type training established at minority institutions has also been suggested [LT Sapp, 1979]. The Coast Guard could establish a special tuition program for disadvantaged students. It could pay for a student's college tuition for the four years with the obligation to serve three years in the Coast Guard as a commissioned officer. And finally direct commissioning once again has been mentioned, both to bring in badly needed black role models at more senior levels and to increase black junior officer participation. Examining these many considerations and recommending guidelines for each could be effectively done by the ad hoc committee which was suggested earlier.

g. Time for Success

Regardless of what innovative strategy is devised to attract more black applicants, it will prove self-defeating if the selection system remains rigidly inflexible and continues to say no, with rare exception, to a particular group. The danger is, that after a while, the recruiting teams simply go through the motion and less and less blacks even apply. Keeping

the adage in mind that success breeds success, it is time for future state black recruiting to see some success. Recruiters must be able to feel positive about their contributions to established goals.

4. Selection

a. Redefinition

The Coast Guard urgently needs a careful examination and redefinition of its selection process for bringing cadets into the academy and OCS officers into the Coast Guard. The present selection processes reflect a certain quality of impenetrability for blacks. This is true because the traditional weighting factors surrounding what the Coast Guard defines as "qualified" are not appropriate. They work to disproportionately exclude blacks from the academy and OCS.

Perhaps most important in redefining the selection process is the necessity to insure that the future state selection process is compatible with affirmative action goals and guidelines. The Coast Guard must get serious and recognize that it cannot reach its established goals for minority officers unless it does something different. As it stands now the overemphasis on academic predictors and a merit selection process combine to practically eliminate all black applicants from entering the Coast Guard's officer ranks.

Since decisions about selection, training, job placement, promotion, transfer, and job redesign all are encompassed by our broadly conceived system of selection and placement, it should be clear that differentiation is central to its effective administration. I shall never cease to be amazed by those persons who, in the name

of equal opportunity, advocate undifferentiated treatment of all persons, men and women, black and white, old and young, with apparently no regard for the greater accuracy to be gained by taking varying factors, depending upon each person's unique pattern of individuality, into account. Those who argue in such a vein confuse valid and useful differentiation with practices of unfair discrimination. [Dunnette, 1970]

If the Coast Guard is to consider itself an institution which trains the leaders of tomorrow, then black leadership must be equitably and fairly included. In particular, the Coast Guard Academy, which is both elite and traditional, two elements which traditionally work to the disadvantage of blacks, has to shed its image of inflexibility.

One academy official in admissions described the academy as a "unique" institution, absolutely fair to all candidates, and that no changes to the selection system were necessary. When asked about affirmative action he implied that the academy was exempt from affirmative action. In contrast, a faculty member, Dr. Cheatham, stated that the admissions process is characterized by rigidity. Relative to the effort to increase black representation in the cadet corps, Dr. Cheatham stated that "they (admissions) are trying to do a non-traditional job with traditional methods. They need to be innovative" [Cheatham, 1979]. Certainly the subject of standards for minority evaluation and admission has generated much controversy. Nevertheless, an active reevaluation of selection standards is sorely needed if the Coast Guard is to successfully practice affirmative action in the officer corps.

Affirmative action has in effect accomplished in American industry a reevaluation of concepts, ideas and employment standards in order to take in people who were formerly kept out. [Northrup, 1974]

b. Predictors

In 1969 a U.S. Military Academy study indicated that the most efficient predictors of black academic performance would be a specifically weighted formula based entirely on black grades. The study concluded that regular predictors are better for predicting white performance than black performance [Hester, 1977]. Golden and Widasky (1976), in analyzing types of errors in the selection of minority students showed that the use of SAT scores and high school rank resulted in reducing the number of students who would ultimately fail. But it also increased the number of individuals who would have passed but were rejected [Hester, 1977]. Hester concluded that a particularly fine screening selection process was detrimental to blacks, as it increased the false negatives in this group more than in others. The selection system, according to Hester should not be so fine-tuned as to reject blacks who are capable of being successful.

However, there is an apparent unwillingness to take risks with greater numbers of black students at the Coast Guard Academy (CGA). The director of admissions, Captain Getman, has a real commitment to increasing the number of blacks at CGA but at the same time wants to maintain the high academic standards of the academy. As indicated previously, the selection process at CGA relies heavily on standardized tests.

Even the 40% whole man concept is contaminated by the influence of the tests as well as the existence of a natural bias in the selection system to prefer whites. It is a natural facet of selection perception to prefer people like oneself [Blodgett, 1972] and very few black officers serve on the cadet evaluation board.

One way the standardized tests hurt blacks in the selection process is, for example, that SAT college entrance examinations tend to subtly place inner city or rural South black students at a disadvantage [Nason, 1976].

Colleges and universities, when challenged on the number of black students they have, are quick to point out the inadequate preparation of blacks. This condition, coupled with the institution's dedication to academic excellence as a goal, cannot help but skew the student body in favor of the whites. Admissions officers currently lament this seemingly insoluble dilemma in black admissions; on the one hand, a directive to increase black admissions substantially, and on the other hand, the directive to maintain and improve the academic quality of entering classes. As has been pointed out, there is no question that the average black precollege education is relatively deficient compared to that of the average white.

However, the admissions offices often add to their problem through the selection criteria used, and thus needlessly deny blacks admission. The most widely used and heavily weighted admission criterion for most institutions of higher education is the SAT. Many admissions officers admit that, even for white middle-class applicants, the SAT does not effectively predict future success. However, for blacks, the SAT is a highly inaccurate predictor of their ability or potential success in college. This inaccuracy is based on the fact that the SAT has been standardized for the traditional college students and their backgrounds. This means relatively affluent whites with college preparatory high school background. It also

means that the test was standardized on middle class values, aspirations, and behavior patterns. Thus, able black applicants have a severe handicap if they come from other walks of life and environments. [Nason, 1976]

c. Special Admissions

The time and circumstances call for the establishment of a special admissions committee at the Coast Guard Academy to specifically increase black participation. It should be an experimental program to run for at least six years, providing for a longitudinal study of the results. Coupled with this special admissions policy has to be an adequate support system for these cadets to be maintained through graduation. (The last time blacks came to the academy via a special admissions route [1975, 1976] the academy was not prepared to provide the necessary support and their rapid departure was considered demonstrative of their failure only.) Providing for a support system for these cadets has far reaching implications and will require an academy-wide effort to help see the program through to success. Remembering that the future state is a period one to three years hence, some of the parameters for success include:

- 1) Making a special effort to increase their technical and interpersonal competence, if necessary.
- 2) Carefully monitor their academic progress. Conduct informal meetings between black cadets and faculty.
- 3) Insure black and white cadets are being trained via their leadership curriculum to understand affirmative action. This may require special training for battalion officers.

4) Establish a special assistant to the superintendent to assist and coordinate the support efforts of minority students. (Perhaps this billet could be established using OMB money specifically designated to enhance minority representation in the Coast Guard.)

5) Insure that each department at the Academy has affirmative action objectives.

6) Provide the faculty and staff the necessary training so they do not resist this change.

The affirmative goal at the Academy for its black cadets has to be a graduation goal. A recruitment goal alone is insufficient.

As for maintaining credibility, if the Coast Guard did a study it would find that most of the elite schools (e.g., Harvard, Dartmouth, MIT, Stanford, etc.) perform affirmative action without any loss of credibility. If anything, they probably enhance their credibility.

A special selection committee should also be screening applications from blacks to OCS. One important task it would face would be to determine valid criteria in order to establish minimum cut-off scores which are still indicative of successful performance as a Coast Guard officer. This may take years of experimental study and will require risk on the part of the Coast Guard. Establishing validity in the OCS selection process will at least help to eliminate the current situation which produces negative effects when it becomes "known" that blacks were selected from below the (arbitrary) cutoff for OCS selection. While increasing the number of blacks through OCS the Coast Guard will also have to insure that the "ideology of differentness" which unfortunately exists, to

some degree, between academy and OCS graduates does not limit their upward mobility. The extension and integration process should not screen out blacks who are otherwise qualified. OCS will have to build in a support system compatible with affirmative action goals. The Coast Guard must also encourage and reward its commanding officers to nominate more black enlisted. This may require commanding officers to more actively participate in preparing and developing some of their black enlisted educationally prior to their applying to OCS.

And finally, how many black officers is enough? The answer lies in the fact that affirmative action is not a matter of wanting only just so many blacks. The established goals should be looked upon as minimums because the circumstances demand an acceleration of black selection. For purposes of illustration, if a four year college was to raise its percentage of minorities from 4 to 15 percent, one-quarter of the incoming freshman class must be minority to do it in two years, 45 percent to do it in one year [Schelling, 1978].

In general, the Coast Guard must be willing to take risks with some black applicants and also expect and accept a higher attrition rate among blacks during the affirmative action years. In taking risks we may learn more about the weaknesses of the present selection system and ultimately achieve a fairer selection system.

A wise society will act to change its institutions without destroying them in order to realize new goals.
[Ginsberg, 1978]

5. Assignment

First and foremost, an affirmative action strategy needs to be a part of the officer assignment process. The position of assigning more blacks to visible operational jobs as opposed to recruiting or staff jobs in headquarters is gaining support. However, certain other assignment practices compatible with affirmative action principles could be undertaken. The numbers of blacks assigned to advanced training (e.g. postgraduate school, Naval War College, etc.) and command positions should be examined. (This relates to selection practices as well since many assignments occur as a result of selection board decisions.) These practices, similar to recruiting could be tied to goals and timetables.

a. A Measuring Technique

One technique, a measuring tool to help reduce institutional discrimination, was developed and studied by Peter E. Nordlie et al. [1974]. This measuring tool requires a comparison between the actual number of personnel actions of a certain type - assignment to command position, for example - with the "expected number" for a particular group if there was only chance variation. In the Nordlie Study, fewer blacks were assigned to command position (U.S. Army) than the expected number based on the proportion

of blacks among those eligible. Former Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity, H. Minton Francis, expressed that "it is that kind of hard to explain difference which exemplifies what we mean by institutional racism" [Air Force Times, 10 May 1976]. The Coast Guard, in its approach to assignments to command or advanced and special training, must be wary of the effects of those assignments on the black officer population. Incorporating a technique similar to the Nordlie instrument on the officer assignment process would be a step in the right direction.

b. Standards

One other consideration in future state assignment policy and practice centers on the attribute of fairness. This attribute is not a normally examined qualification for any assignment as it is difficult to assess. Nevertheless, it deserves particular attention and priority in the assignment of an officer to a critical, influential billet affecting other people's career paths. Examples of these billets include assignments as commanding officers, assignment detailers, personnel officers, etc.

One option to test fairness would be to screen an officer's behavior as to whom he promotes, whom he assigns to training, how he administers non-judicial punishment, etc., to determine if any trend of bias or impartiality exists. Another option would be to administer a standardized test instrument on fairness to officers if one were found to be valid.

6. Promotion

a. Fully Qualified vs Best Qualified

No officer should be promoted who is not competent or qualified for the duties inherent of the next rank. However the more subjective distinction between "fully qualified" and "best qualified" may be too exclusionary for promoting some black officers fairly. Rear Admiral R.H. Wood, USCG, has stated that "there is still a defensive reliance upon 'standards' and a strong position about not intervening in the 'system'...I think that perhaps we should be looking at such devices as direct commissioning (of minorities) and making certain that when a number of candidates are 'qualified' that an argument for 'best qualified' is not being used in reality as an excuse for continuing the long term discrimination which has existed for so many years" [G-A/83 Coast Guard Memorandum dated 19 Dec. 1978]. The evidence is fairly strong that performance ratings of blacks by whites may not accurately reflect the quality of their performance. Studies [Hamner, Kim, Baird, & Bigoness, 1976; Richards & Jaffee, 1972; Parker, 1976] point out that black performance is often undervalued [Ford & Bagot, 1978].

In the future state the Coast Guard affirmative action strategy should include the promotion of all black officers who are fully qualified. This policy is needed to insure that every attempt is being made to achieve a better

balance in the higher ranks. There may be some initial difficulty with working out the mechanics of this policy in the promotion system but this can be worked out. Most people will be willing to accommodate some degree of perceived unfairness, temporarily, if they believe it is in the interest of fairness and equity in the organization in the long term. Characterizing this policy as "reverse discrimination" is only avoiding the responsibility to implement changes and accommodate affirmative action goals. Affirmative action requires top leadership to take strong action stances and change certain priorities to insure affirmative action goals are reached.

b. A Management Information System

One difficulty for upper management in the Coast Guard in assessing the total picture related to black upward mobility is that they lack an adequate management information system. Statistics concerning promotion and other important areas on blacks are difficult to locate, perhaps because in some instances the Coast Guard does not keep them. Regardless, decision-makers and policy-makers in the Coast Guard must be aware of the complete set of facts on black officer progress. The "eyes wide open" definition of affirmative action applies. Thus, statistics concerning blacks' fitness reports, promotions, extensions, integration, attrition, etc., must be made easily available, not spread out in various Coast Guard divisions and locations, or unrecorded. The Coast Guard needs a consolidated report which reports out on the various programs each year by

race, not by minority. The reporting of information on how black officers are faring is vital to affirmative action.

c. Fitness Report

Moreover, the fitness report form used in the Coast Guard for evaluating officers needs to better reflect the performance of officers on how they develop and train black officers whom they evaluate. An examination of approximately 200 sanitized (names removed) fitness reports on lieutenant commanders and commanders in the Coast Guard revealed that the specific comment required on the fitness report concerning EEO responsibilities was essentially a pro forma statement - LCDR or CDR _____ complies with the EEO policies of the Commandant as per Commandant Instruction 5354.2 [Personal observation].

d. Validity

A final consideration in the future state promotion policy is the issue of validity. The legal requirements [EEO act of 1972 and the most recent guideline on employee selection procedures, 1978] indicate that methods of selection, assignment and promotion must be validated if they screen out minorities or women at a greater rate than others.

7. Civil Rights Training

In the effort to measure black progress in recent years little attention has been paid to white progress toward acceptance of a racially diverse society. [Dreyfuss and Lawrence, 1979]

Civil rights training in the Coast Guard is keyed toward improving race relations. It has significant impact

on the organizational climate and the missions of the Coast Guard. It is also critical to the support of a future state Coast Guard affirmative action program. Important in this future effort will be the continuing need to focus attention on institutional racism and individual prejudice and bias.

Race relations education and training in general is perhaps at a crossroad. Its value has been questioned, and the many techniques and methods associated with it have not necessarily proved effective. In addition, evaluation studies and standards have been less than adequate in many instances. Finally, some of the major problems faced by practitioners in the field have been a factor:

- 1) A lack of institutional support (i.e., commitment of upper management).
- 2) A lack of sufficiently long education/training periods with allowances for incubation time.
- 3) A high level of white resistance to full participation. [Hayles, 1977]

"High priority needs include well developed links between practice, evaluation and research (basic, applied, and theoretical). Race relations education/training should be evaluated on the basis of the acquisition, appropriate use, and refinement of behaviors which contribute to harmonious inter-ethnic relations. While looking at the number of people of color hired, trained, and promoted provides data appropriate for evaluating programs aimed at reducing institutional racism, more attention must be given to the inter-ethnic behaviors of individuals which either support or combat institutional racism" [Hayles, 1977].

a. Challenging Assumptions

In the effort to reduce institutional racism and individual negative behaviors in the Coast Guard officer corps, a more effective training format is required. Attention to changing the behaviors of Coast Guard officers in general to reflect more rational attitudes toward those people who are perceived as "different" is needed. Just as Douglas McGregor challenges managers, in the Human Side of Enterprise (1960), to question their basic assumptions they hold toward the people they lead (such as the assumption that the average person dislikes work, has little ambition, needs to be controlled and directed, even threatened to perform satisfactorily), the Coast Guard must offer its officers appropriate training which challenges their basic assumptions about differences between people with different skin color. "The chances of keeping American Society from coming unglued depend to no small degree on overcoming irrational attitudes toward the colors of our fellow human beings" [Ehrlich, 1977].

White officers must begin to understand the current dynamics of racism. Dr. Price Cobbs, a San Francisco psychiatrist and management consultant for large corporations has said that "racism is alive and well...the subtlety of the New Racism makes it no less real. A primary manifestation of this is the perception that white middle and top managers have about blacks. We are dealing with a range of preconscious assumptions about the relative competence of blacks, about the intelligence of blacks. You run into good, well-motivated

people who think they are fair, who feel they have turned around attitudes and beliefs of ten to fifteen years ago but who continue to view blacks in a deficit model: 'less than,' 'not as good as,' 'if we could only do so-and-so to bring them up to speed.' If you look back much of what passed for benign race relations was some kind of social comfort on the part of whites who were dealing with blacks. There are many whites who can be comfortable socially but who don't have any idea of the depth and degree of their remaining negative assumptions about people who are different" [Dreyfuss and Lawrence, 1979].

To help eliminate this entrenched subtle form of racism which Dr. Cobbs describes, the Coast Guard training format must include a thorough attack on the myths of racism. Even the concept of race should be explored. Paul Ehrlich, in The Race Bomb (1977), vehemently and articulately diffuses the many myths embedded in racism and clarifies that there are no biological races. The common division of races (black, white, and yellow) are arbitrary divisions which have no validity. "In short, races have a social reality that is seen by the ignorant as a biological reality and associated with a variety of prejudices about inferiority and superiority" [Ehrlich, 1977]. Ehrlich also debates the race-IQ question and reveals the inferiority or superiority of a race as meaningless.

b. Leadership Training

Future state training must also include an emphasis on reducing the perceived threat of affirmative action to white officers. This emphasis, as well as other already cited, needs to appear in more than present state civil rights training efforts. The Coast Guard needs to use all the creditable avenues for teaching civil rights training. Civil rights training must be viewed in the larger context of leadership training. For example, the Coast Guard leadership school, influential in affecting the attitudes of officers, must not disregard equal opportunity and affirmative action issues. The senior officer curriculum (commanders and above) especially should include a concentrated portion on affirmative action. Besides examining basic assumptions, a thorough analysis of the equal opportunity statistics in the Coast Guard and a complete explanation/discussion on affirmative action, including the legal aspects, should be undertaken. The junior officer course should include, for both white and black officers, a concentration on examining the consequences of racial attitudes and developing skills in how to deal with people of all skin colors and ethnic backgrounds. This would be a human relations approach, not a race relations approach.

c. Mentors

Another future state training consideration should include developing the concept of mentors for blacks. With rare exception, leaders are socialized by mentors. Rosen and Turner (1971) provide support for the role of the mentor or

buddy system as a way to integrate minorities into an organization. To be integrated more fully, blacks need inclusion into the informal system of the officer corps. They need to know how to make a "psychological contract" with the Coast Guard. This means learning the norms, standards, history, and especially the politics of the organization. It also means knowing what paths are necessary to success, and where the stumbling blocks are. And finally, the black needs to understand which behaviors produce success. A mentor can be of significant help in enabling a black officer to ground himself comfortably in the informal system. But first, more senior Coast Guard officers need to be willing to reach out to younger black officers and take on the role of a mentor, otherwise known as an "agent of growth." The maintenance of black officers' growth is as important as their entry into the Coast Guard.

However, given that a recent report indicated that many senior officers, above the rank of lieutenant commander, may be fairly insular in their thinking and that bias is more likely to occur in the senior people of the service [LT Williams, 1979; RADM W.H. Stewart, 1979], it may be appropriate to retrain our senior people in their views toward society. Specific programs besides leadership school might include Coast Guard sponsored senior management conferences and continuing education seminars. Perhaps then the mentor process, so vital to upward mobility, will become more of a reality for black officers.

d. Summary

In sum, affirmative action needs to be supported by appropriate training. The civil rights training the officers receive should be able to challenge and unmask the irrational theories that are carried around by each officer about his concepts of race. This training and other proposed training is needed to prevent a polarization of attitudes between blacks and whites which can occur if the organization is not adequately prepared for affirmative action.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This research project is about affirmative action in the Coast Guard officer ranks and an organizational change process to influence its direction. I have suggested ways to increase black officer representation in the Coast Guard. The following is a summary of those recommendations.

A. THE COMMANDANT

1. The Commandant must take a more active, positive and personal approach to bring affirmative action to force in the officer corps for black officers. He must provide emotional support of affirmative action which is evident to blacks and whites in the Coast Guard.

B. THE ACADEMY AND OCS

1. Establish a special admissions committee to select qualified black officer candidates. This should be an experimental program to run for at least six to ten years. Include built-in support systems which account for affirmative action goals and objectives beyond the initial entry point.

2. The Coast Guard Academy should establish a special billet for an assistant to the Superintendent to assist and coordinate the support efforts for black students matriculating under special admission.

C. RECRUITING

1. The recruiting elements for black officers should carefully examine their assumptions about the size and quality of the pool of potential black candidates for the academy and OCS.
2. Expand the recruiting coverage to include black junior college graduates who may be interested and qualified for the academy.

3. The recruiting effort should include a more personalized approach from senior Coast Guard officials. On occasion, a District Commander, the superintendent, the dean, or other admirals and captains could become directly involved in recruiting black officers, either through personal telephone calls or visits to the candidates' homes.

D. THE COAST GUARD

1. The Coast Guard's approach to equal opportunity and affirmative action should be a comprehensive systems approach which merges affirmative action and equal opportunity into the larger context of a human resource management system.

2. The Coast Guard should concentrate on developing its officers to be attitudinally prepared to understand and accept a dramatic increase in black officer participation.

a. Include equal opportunity and affirmative action issues in the officer leadership school curriculum;

they should be especially emphasized in the senior officer curriculum.

3. The Coast Guard should identify clearly the subtle hurdles and barriers which operate to exclude blacks disproportionately from employment practices in the officer corps.

4. The Coast Guard should institute a feedback system for gathering information on the racial climate in the officer corps to assist in determining future actions and strategy.

5. The Coast Guard should build into its budget the appropriate commitment to support increased affirmative action.

6. The Coast Guard should establish an ad hoc committee, similar to the Professional Military Training Advisory Committee (PMTAC), to meet regularly to offer guidance to the Coast Guard in improving its equal opportunity and affirmative action posture.

7. The Coast Guard should carefully examine and redefine its officer selection procedures more compatibly with federal affirmative action requirements.

8. The Coast Guard should develop a management information system which provides complete statistics on black officer progress into and in the Coast Guard.

9. The Coast Guard should include a change to its fitness report system which provides for a more specific

way to elucidate comments on the equal opportunity portion of the form.

10. In future civil rights training, a format should be created which vigorously challenges the basic assumptions held by officers surrounding their concept of race.

11. The Coast Guard should develop an affirmative action policy for future officer assignments.

12. The Coast Guard should promote all black officers who are fully qualified.

I have argued the rationale for these recommendations throughout this paper. While it is recognized that they are not easy to accomplish, in my judgment they are necessary if the Coast Guard is to remain independent in controlling its own human resource policies. Although I have discussed affirmative action in particular, the focus of the paper is on the integration of affirmative action into the Coast Guard's human resource management system. It is recognized that the Coast Guard has other "human" problems and challenges besides equal opportunity and affirmative action. Organizational change for the "human" organization is not just for equal opportunity, it is for other areas as well. In addition, as noted earlier, equal opportunity and affirmative action need to be merged with other processes in the human-social subsystem, such as leadership philosophy, rewards, and values.

As this review of Coast Guard personnel practices demonstrates, the present equal opportunity policies of zealously guarding against inequality will likely add many years to accomplishing the goal of equitable black representation in the Coast Guard officer ranks. No doubt, in accelerating the process, there may be difficulties with implementing dramatic affirmative action change in the Coast Guard, such as increasing the perceived threat to white officer advancement. Complaints of reverse discrimination may well occur. The Coast Guard must be prepared to address these problems through appropriate education and manpower planning. Most Coast Guard officers may well be willing to accept increased selection programs for black officers for a temporary period if they felt they were necessary to produce equity in the not too distant future.

In adopting an increased affirmative action posture, the Coast Guard must present its new policies as a set of sequential steps which over time will increase the representation of blacks in the officer ranks. Although temporary, these steps would include, among others, expanded black recruitment, expanded admission to the academy and OCS, expanded training of white officers as mentors, as well as skill and status enhancing assignments for black officers. For example, if greater numbers of blacks attend the Coast Guard Academy over the next four years, the development of a wider pool of potential mentors for blacks

should be emphasized four years from now as more black cadets begin to graduate. But, in time, a formal program for training mentors will no longer be necessary as blacks are integrated into the officer ranks more fully. Affirmative action goals need built-in support systems to insure success. A recruitment goal is insufficient by itself. Other goals and objectives need to be established to support affirmative action after blacks enter the various officer programs.

In the long term black officers must have their equal chance of becoming Commandant of the Coast Guard. Therefore, if blacks represent about 11% of the population, the Coast Guard needs to insure that it has a fair representation of black Coast Guard captains twenty to thirty years from now. The one black captain in the Coast Guard today may have as equal of a chance as any other captain of becoming Commandant but blacks have about a one in 300 chance of becoming Commandant, as there are approximately 300 captains in the Coast Guard. If we have 300 captains twenty to thirty years from now we should also have approximately 30 black captains. Then maybe we will begin to see black admirals, and a black Commandant.

My vision of affirmative action in the Coast Guard is that in ten to thirty years from now it will have changed the Coast Guard's nearly total white image in a manner that was not only fair, but increased the effectiveness of the

organization at the same time. I don't believe you can do affirmative action in bits and pieces and be satisfied with the rate of social change that produces negligible results. Nor do I think the government will tolerate the disproportionate black representation in the officer ranks much longer. However, an effective, well implemented affirmative action strategy is probably the best defense against any imposed solution by outside sources.

In Chapters III and IV I presented and used an organization development model. The model is useful in defining a problem and developing a strategy to assist in achieving goals determined to solve the problem. The model argues for establishing clearly defined organizational conditions; the present state, the future state, and the transition state. One important reason for defining the present state and the future state is that it locates the transition state, i.e., it permits the manager to set this crucial period of time and state of affairs into a distinct perspective.

This thesis is an illustration of the use of part of the model. I have defined a present state, and envisioned a future state of Coast Guard affirmative action for black officers. Both of these states were perhaps underdefined, and the transition state remains to be considered. The Coast Guard needs to articulate its own present and future states, and then determine a transition state which can effectively act as a "roadmap" to its desired future.

Establishing goals is part of policy planning, and clearly articulating a strategy to achieve those goals is critical to their success. The Beckhard and Harris model is one way the Coast Guard can focus on affirmative action for black officers and develop a viable strategy. A central part of that strategy which keys on the transition state is pointed out by Beckhard and Harris:


We define a large system change strategy as a plan defining what intervention to make when, by whom, and at what time in order to move the organization to a state where it can optimally transform needs into results in a social environment that nurtures people's worth and dignity. Managerially, this means defining the kinds of activities that need to be induced and the kinds of expertise that need to be brought to bear to help with the change; identifying people in the organization who need to become committed to the change; establishing a timetable and specifying priorities of changes and practices in procedures, rewards, policies, and behavior; establishing a system of evaluating progress toward a new state; and providing education in skills needed to both operate in the new condition and manage the change.

[Beckhard & Harris, 1977]

If the Coast Guard carefully defines what its desired future is to be relative to black officer participation it has a better chance of achieving it. Defining the transition state establishes the key processes for the change strategy compatible with that future state.

I believe it is time for change. If blacks are to participate more fully in the Coast Guard over the next thirty years it will require significant affirmative action in the short run.

APPENDIX A



ORGANIZATION AND STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT PLANNING MODEL


APPENDIX B

CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY STATEMENT

Transportation vitally affects the social and economic development of our urban and rural communities and influences the mobility patterns and provides employment and recreational opportunities for millions of Americans. It is the policy of the Department of Transportation, in carrying out its programs, that there shall be no discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin or age. There shall be vigorous affirmative action to assure full, fair and representative participation of minorities and women.

Minorities and women shall be involved actively in the formulation of transportation policies, and shall participate fully in the Department's decision-making process. Equal employment must become a reality in this Department, expressed by substantial increases in the number of minorities and women at all grade levels in the DOT work force. The Department shall aggressively enforce contract compliance requirements and nondiscrimination provisions applicable to all Federally assisted programs. Businesses and firms owned by minorities and women will receive an equitable share of the procurement arising from the Department's programs.

The implementation of this policy shall be a top priority. I shall insist that it be thoroughly understood, rigorously followed and recognized as an integral part of every program of this Department. I shall hold the administrators, managers and supervisors at every level in the Department accountable for the implementation of this policy and the full realization of these goals. The Department of Transportation will be a leader in the provision of equal opportunity for all Americans.



Brock Adams
Secretary of Transportation

March 31 1977

MINORITY COMMISSIONING STATUS ACTIVE DUTY OFFICERS ALL PROGRAM SOURCES

	FISCAL YEAR										
	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
MINORITY OCS GRADS	167	337	259	146	144	127	126	183	200	139	13
MINORITY ACADEMY GRADS	3	2	8	6	3	9	12	11	9	9	13
DIRECT COMMISSION MINORITIES	0	0	2	0	0	2	3	3	41	82	0
TOTAL MINORITY COMMISSIONS	4	2	21	11	5	16	23	22	21	25	—
TOTAL COMMISSIONS	420	553	497	392	386	333	398	460	419	433	—
% MINORITY OFFICERS COMMISSIONED	1.0	0.3	4.2	2.8	2.1	4.8	5.7	4.7	5.0	5.8	—

Top number in box represents
total number commissioned.
These numbers added by R.W. Thorne

COL/MA OFFICERS

	TOT ERS	TOT BLACK PERCENT	SPANISH TOT PERCENT	INDIAN TOT PERCENT	TOT ORIENTAL TOT PERCENT	TOT OTHER TOT PERCENT
05-010	933	1	0	1	2	.2
0-4	974	4	.5	3	1	.1
0-3	1,369	25	4.4	9	0	.0
0-2	1,093	21	1.9	8	7	.1
0-1	463	12	2.6	9	1.9	.6
TOTAL CO	4,732	63	1.3	29	.6	.3
					.0	.0
					.5	.5
					23	23
					.5	4,615
						97.5
WARRANT OFFICERS						
W-4	318	8	2.5	2	0	.0
W-3	380	6	1.6	1	3	.3
W-2	651	8	1.2	4	6	.0
W-1	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL WO	1,349	22	1.6	7	5	1
					.1	.1
					27	27
					2.0	2.0
					1,292	1,292
						95.8
ENLISTED PERS						
E-10	1	0	0	0	0	.0
E-9	306	6	2.0	1	3	0
E-8	479	9	1.9	6	1.3	0
E-7	2,666	46	1.7	23	9	4
E-6	5,071	208	4.1	80	1.6	2
E-5	5,183	379	7.3	119	2.3	12
E-4	6,695	693	10.4	245	3.7	13
E-3	5,061	572	11.3	225	4.4	31
E-2	4,306	602	14.0	173	4.0	39
E-1	958	116	12.1	46	4.8	35
AVCAD	0	0	0	0	0	0
OCS	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL ENL	30,726	2,631	8.6	918	3.0	136
					.4	906
						2.9
						26,135
TOTAL	33,807	2,716	7.4	954	2.6	139
					.4	356
						85.1
						87.1
						32,042

RECRUITING

1. FY 79 Objectives

Recruit officers, cadets, and enlisted personnel to achieve 100% of quota and to attain goal of 18% minority recruiting rate.

II. Attainment of Goals

Regular enlisted minority recruiting rate for FY 79 is currently at 16.2%.

III. DataCoast Guard Academy - Entering Cadets

	TOTAL	MINORITIES		PERCENT	WOMEN
		PERCENT	NUMBER		
CLASS OF '72	343	15	4.4	-	-
CLASS OF '73	409	13	3.1	-	-
CLASS OF '74	318	7	2.2	-	-
CLASS OF '75	330	10	3.0	-	-
CLASS OF '76	432	13	3.0	-	-
CLASS OF '77	397	10	2.5	-	-
CLASS OF '78	355	8	2.3	10.1	-
CLASS OF '79	398	14	3.5	-	-
CLASS OF '80	327	3	0	38(1 MIN.)	44
CLASS OF '81	326	14	4	0	3.7
CLASS OF '82	299	12	4	0	5.0
CLASS OF '83	316	15	4	1	30(2 MIN.)
		26	9	2	39(7 MIN.)
<u>Officer Candidate School Graduates</u>	<u>167</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
FY-70	167	3	1.8	-	-
FY-71	337	2	.6	-	-
FY-72	259	8	3.1	-	-
FY-73	146	6	4.1	5	5
FY-74	144	3	2.1	13	13
FY-75	127	9	7.0	15	15
FY-76	126	12	9.5	18	18
FY-76A - 77	183	11	6.0	11	11
FY-78	200	9	4.5	10	10
FY-79 (3rd QTR)	85	8	9.4	5	5

INTEGRATION AND EXTENSION STATISTICS FOR MINORITIES AND WOMEN

	INTEGRATION			EXTENSION		
	76	77	78	76	77	78
Calender Year	76	77	78	96	94	86
Total Applied	77	77	70	56	68	69
Total Selected	54	73	70	58.3%	72.3%	80.2%
Selection Ratio	70.1%	94.8%	100%			
Minorities Eligible	2	4	2	3	2	7
Minorities Applied	2	4	1	3	2	1
Minorities Selected	1	2	1	1	1	0
Women Eligible	0	5	3	7	11	19
Women Applied	0	2	2	7	9	10
Women Selected	0	2	2	5	8	7
Selection Ratio Minorities	50%	50%	100%	33.3%	50%	0
Selection Ratio Women	0	100%	100%	71.4%	88.8%	70%

By: Lieutenant Commander J.T. SALAS
 Chief, Minority Recruiting Branch
 12/14/78

CLASS OF

	1980		1981		1982		1983	
	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>MINORITIES</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>MINORITIES</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>MINORITIES</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>MINORITIES</u>
APPLICATIONS	9,992	456 (4.6%)	8,669	380 (4.4%)	8,165	366 (4.5%)	7,165	513 (7.2%)
FINALISTS	3,245	82 (2.5%)	3,391	119 (3.5%)	3,062	111 (3.6%)	2,500	160 (6.4%)
TENDERED	551	22 (4.0%)	543	36 (6.6%)	479	32 (6.7%)	541	48 (8.9%)
SWORN-IN	327	15 (4.6%)	326	12 (3.7%)	299	16 (5.3%)	316	26 (8.2%)
ON BOARD	173	11 (6.3%)	172	3 (1.7%)	207	11 (5.3%)	274	22 (8.0%)
Blacks on board							1982	1983
Originally	3	(0.9%)					2 (0.7%)	9 (2.8%)
Currently	3	(1.7%)					1 (0.5%)	8 (2.9%)

MINORITY STATISTICS

USCGA CLASSES 1973 - 1983

CLASS OF	APPLICATIONS	FINALISTS	TENDERED APPOINTMENTS	SWORN-IN	TOTAL CLASS GRADUATED/ ON BOARD(%)	
					GRADUATED/ ON BOARD (%)	ON BOARD (%)
1973	-	-	-	13	5	38
1974	-	-	-	7	4	57
1975	-	-	-	9	5	56
1976	-	-	-	12	8	67
1977	-	-	-	10	5	50
1978	355	101	68	37	12	32
1979	380	151	53	35	12	34
1980	456	82	22	15	11	73
1981	380	119	36	12	3	25
1982	366	111	32	16	11	69
1983	513	160	48	26	22	85

APPENDIX D

G-H/83

7 March 1979

SUBJ: FY-1989 Special Studies; suggested topic

FROM: Deputy Chief, Office of Civil Rights

TO: Chief, Plans Evaluation Division

Ref: (a) Planning and Programming Manual (CG-411)
(b) Your Memo 5010 of 15 FEB 1979

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the following suggested topic is submitted for analytical study in FY 1980:

a. Subject of Study Proposal

The examination into the feasibility of creating a Coast Guard "Organizational Development" program.

b. Background for Study Proposal

The Coast Guard treasures its traditions, but advances in technology and other problems of the closing decades of the twentieth century point in new directions, for which tradition offers small guidance. Rampant changes in social values and the composition of our human resources, necessitate that a servicewide program of "prevention" be examined and identified, in order to gain optimum usage of our most important asset--our people.

c. Definition of Problems

District and Unit Commanders are faced with radical departures in the social composition of the Coast Guard today and tomorrow versus yesterday. Minority and female members continue to expand in numbers and in range of assignments and responsibilities. Although various "human" or "soft" programs are now in existence and available to Commanders, they are primarily directed toward the individual on a "put out the fire" basis. Programs under the following headings operate without total uniformity throughout the Coast Guard:

- Civil Rights	- Human Relations
- Leadership	- Drug Abuse
- Alcohol Abuse	- Senior Enlisted Advisors
- Safety	- Mutual Aid
- Religious Counsel	

2. It is recommended that efforts be made to consolidate existing people programs into one program identified as "organizational development" wherein Commanders would be able to deal with the following goals:

- a. Increased awareness by all personnel of the importance of human goals and the need for the highest standards of personal conduct.
- b. An improved state of unit readiness.
- c. Improved communication at all levels in the chain of command.
- d. Improved image of the Coast Guard as a professional organization which recognizes the worth and dignity of the individual and his or her family.
- e. Improved leadership and human resource management practices at all levels.
- f. Improved career and job satisfaction.
- g. Total involvement of the chain of command in all efforts to improve the safety, productivity and effectiveness of its human resources.
- h. Insurance of uniformity and equality in application of discipline, military justice and administrative practices.
- i. Increased ability of all Coast Guard personnel to recognize the symptoms and dangers of alcohol and drug abuse which lead to reduced performance, accidents, disciplinary infractions, health and family problems, injuries and death.
- j. Development of a Human Goals Action Plan by all commands.
- k. Improved retention of quality personnel.

3. This type of program is currently employed by the U.S. Navy, under the heading "Human Resources Management", involving some 1800 full-time HRM Specialists, trained in the behavioral sciences by the Navy at existing Navy schools. It is primarily directed towards command improvement and productivity rather than isolated individual satisfaction. The HRM Specialists operate in terms as special consultants to local Commanders.

4. Anticipated Resources Required

Staff: - One O-5/6
One O-3/4
One E-6/7

Contractual: None contemplated - the U.S. Navy has already researched this matter thoroughly via a myriad of contractors - their costs to date exceed \$6 million. The Coast Guard can obtain all required data from BUPERS 61/62, Washington, D.C.

Expected Time Frame: One year maximum.

S. J. WALDEN

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Thorne
Applying organiza-
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Thorne
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Applying organization development to Coa



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